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Public Health Originalism and the 
First Amendment 
Claudia E. Haupt  & Wendy E. Parmet  
Abstract  
Current First Amendment doctrine has set public health 
regulation and protections for commercial speech on a collision 
course. This Article examines the permissibility of compelled 
public health and safety warnings after the Supreme Court’s 
decision in National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. 
Becerra (NIFLA) through the lens of a concurrence to the Ninth 
Circuit’s en banc decision in American Beverage Ass’n v. City & 
County of San Francisco (American Beverage II) suggesting that 
only health and safety warnings dating back to 1791 are 
presumptively constitutional under the First Amendment.  
Rejecting this form of “public health originalism,” this 
Article first assesses the current doctrinal landscape of 
compelled public health and safety warnings in the context of 
commercial speech. It then turns to the history of such warnings, 
revealing that contrary to apparent assumptions underlying 
“public health originalism” in its deregulatory form, laws 
compelling speech including to protect public health existed in 
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the framing era and were not thought to clash, in the modern 
sense, with individual liberties, including the freedom of 
expression. Finally, this Article offers a reading of NIFLA in 
light of the underlying normative interests of speakers and 
listeners that attempts to reconcile contemporary First 
Amendment doctrine and compelled public health and safety 
warnings. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The deregulatory impact of the Supreme Court’s approach 
to the First Amendment has attracted the attention of judges 
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and scholars for some time.1 Public health and safety 
regulations previously considered permissible are facing new 
risks,2 illustrating the stakes of this theoretically questionable 
approach. But while critics of the deregulatory First 
Amendment frequently invoke a throwback to the Lochner era,3 
 
 1. See, e.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Council 
31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2502 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority has 
chosen the winners by turning the First Amendment into a sword, and using 
it against workaday economic and regulatory policy.”); Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & 
Life Advocs. v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2383 (2018) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (“Using the First Amendment to strike down economic and social 
laws . . . will, for the American public, obscure, not clarify, the true value of 
protecting freedom of speech.”); Genevieve Lakier, The First Amendment’s 
Real Lochner Problem, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 1241, 1242 (2020) (“The ghost of 
Lochner . . . haunts contemporary free speech law.”); Morgan N. Weiland, 
Expanding the Periphery and Threatening the Core: The Ascendant 
Libertarian Speech Tradition, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1454 (2017) (“By 
conceptualizing corporate and listeners’ interests as aligned because both 
benefit from deregulation, the Court has developed a tradition in which 
corporate interests are always vindicated while listeners’ interests are not.”); 
Julie E. Cohen, The Zombie First Amendment, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1119, 
1157–58 (2015) (describing how the First Amendment has been used to 
advance economic interests); Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s 
First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 165, 167 (2015) (“[T]he First 
Amendment has become a powerful engine of constitutional deregulation.”); 
Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 137 (“Courts’ 
growing protection of commercial speech threatens to revive a sort of 
Lochnerian constitutional economic deregulation . . . .”); C. Edwin Baker, The 
First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 84 IND. L.J. 981, 990–94 (2009) 
(arguing that commercial speech should be subject to regulation due to its 
relation to market transactions); Tamara R. Piety, Against Freedom of 
Commercial Expression, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2583, 2588 (2008) (arguing 
against the expansive protection of commercial speech, especially as applied 
to for-profit corporations); Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of 
Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 10 (2000) (“Nothing could be more 
damaging to the First Amendment than to equate it with a specific economic 
perspective, and in this way to transform it into a mere ‘basis for reviewing 
economic regulations.’”). 
 2. See Andra Lim, Note, Limiting NIFLA, 72 STAN. L. REV. 127, 141–48 
(2020) (discussing lawsuits raising First Amendment claims that have thrown 
into question the constitutional status of commercial warnings and 
disclosures). 
 3. See generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See Shanor, 
supra note 1, at 135 (“[A] growing number of scholars, commentators, and 
judges have likened aspects of recent First Amendment jurisprudence to 
Lochner v. New York’s anticanonical liberty of contract.”). 
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we may have to look back even further. Concurring in American 
Beverage Ass’n v. City & County of San Francisco (American 
Beverage II)4—a Ninth Circuit en banc decision ordering a 
preliminary injunction against a San Francisco ordinance 
requiring certain health warnings on ads for sugary 
beverages—Judge Ikuta notably remarked that while it is not 
evident “what sorts of health and safety warnings date back to 
1791, . . . warnings about sugar-sweetened beverages are 
clearly not among them.”5 If followed by other judges, this 
interpretive approach, which we call “public health 
originalism,” poses a fundamental challenge to modern public 
health and safety regulation.  
Both the en banc decision6 and Judge Ikuta’s concurrence7 
in American Beverage II explicitly relied on the Supreme Court’s 
decision in National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. 
Becerra (NIFLA),8 which struck down a California law 
regulating speech at crisis pregnancy centers (CPCs).9 Justice 
Thomas’ opinion for the Court in NIFLA has created deep 
doctrinal confusion.10 Most critical, for present purposes, is 
 
 4. 916 F.3d 749 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc). 
 5. Id. at 762 (Ikuta, J., concurring). 
 6. Id. at 753 (majority opinion) (“Relying on the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in [NIFLA], we conclude that Plaintiffs will likely succeed on 
the merits of their claim that the Ordinance is an ‘unjustified or unduly 
burdensome disclosure requirement that might offend the First Amendment 
by chilling protected commercial speech.’” (citation omitted)). 
 7. Id. at 758 (Ikuta, J., concurring) (“In [NIFLA], the Supreme Court 
provided a framework for analyzing First Amendment challenges to 
government-compelled speech.” (citation omitted)). 
 8. 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). For a discussion of NIFLA, see generally Lim, 
supra note 2; Thea Raymond-Sidel, Note, I Saw the Sign: NIFLA v. Becerra 
and Informed Consent to Abortion, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2279 (2019). 
 9. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2368, 2378.  
 10. See Wendy E. Parmet et al., The Supreme Court’s Crisis Pregnancy 
Center Case—Implications for Health Law, 379 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1489, 
1490– 91 (2018) (discussing the constitutional jeopardy of health laws 
following NIFLA that were once assumed to be constitutional); Claudia E. 
Haupt, The Limits of Professional Speech, 128 YALE L.J.F. 185, 187 (2018) 
(“[The] majority opinion devotes a substantial discussion to professional 
speech before ultimately deciding the case on other grounds . . . suggest[ing] 
that there remains considerable uncertainty about the definition of 
professional speech.”); Vikram David Amar & Alan Brownstein, Toward a 
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NIFLA’s impact on the “states’ ability to protect public health 
by regulating commercial speech.”11 As one of the first federal 
appellate court decisions to apply NIFLA, American Beverage II 
vividly illustrates NIFLA’s potential danger to public health 
laws.12 Further, although Judge Ikuta’s opinion represents only 
the views of one judge from the Court of Appeals, her linkage of 
NIFLA to originalism, and her suggestion that the 
constitutionality of health and safety warning laws depends 
upon their legal status in 1791 demands examination, as they 
offer an interpretation that reflects several elements of the 
originalist critique of the regulatory state.13 Her opinion thus 
may well foretell future decisions that rely on public health 
originalism.14 For that reason, it is critical that the 
misunderstandings upon which her approach lie are exposed 
now, rather than once this approach is more widely adopted.  
In this Article, we argue that public health originalism is 
based on a misreading of NIFLA and a misguided 
understanding of history, doctrine, theory, and policy. Exposing 
judicial misunderstandings of both doctrine and history, and 
clarifying what NIFLA permits in terms of health and safety are 
vital to ensure that both states and the federal government15 
can continue to protect public health effectively without running 
afoul of the First Amendment.  
 
More Explicit, Independent, Consistent and Nuanced Compelled Speech 
Doctrine, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 27 n.132 (“The majority’s arguments 
suggesting a narrow limiting of the government’s ability to restrict or compel 
professional speech in NIFLA are the most disturbing aspects of a generally 
unpersuasive opinion.”).  
 11. Parmet et al., supra note 10, at 1490.  
 12. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2381 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[The 
majority’s] test invites courts around the Nation to apply an unpredictable 
First Amendment to ordinary social and economic regulation, striking down 
disclosure laws that judges may disfavor, while upholding others, all without 
grounding their decisions in reasoned principle.”). 
 13. See infra Part II. 
 14. See infra Part III. 
 15. See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski, The Lochnerized First Amendment and the 
FDA: Toward a More Democratic Political Economy, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 
ONLINE 179, 180 (2018) (“There may be no edifice of public regulatory power 
more immediately threatened by this trend than the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA).”). 
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This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I introduces the 
American Beverage litigation and situates it within commercial 
speech doctrine more broadly. In particular, we discuss the 
Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Zauderer v. Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel16 which previously controlled how 
compelled commercial disclosures were reviewed. We then 
examine several circuit court decisions prior to American 
Beverage, which sought to interpret Zauderer, as well as the 
Ninth Circuit’s panel decision in American Beverage I. Finally, 
we introduce the Supreme Court’s NIFLA decision and discuss 
how the Ninth Circuit viewed its reinterpretation of Zauderer 
in its own en banc decision in American Beverage II, which 
misread the Supreme Court’s NIFLA decision in important 
respects.  
Part II interrogates Judge Ikuta’s “public health 
originalism.” After discussing what she appears to mean, we 
explore some specific challenges and implications that arise 
from determining the constitutionality of compelled health and 
safety warnings by looking to whether they were accepted as 
constitutional in 1791.17 These include the obvious point that 
 
 16. 471 U.S. 626 (1985). 
 17. We do not revisit larger debates about the viability or legitimacy of 
originalism as a method of constitutional interpretation writ large. The 
literature on originalism is vast. Some recent contributions include Randy E. 
Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Letter and the Spirit: A Unified Theory of 
Originalism, 107 GEO. L.J. 1 (2018); Cass R. Sunstein, Originalism, 93 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1671 (2018); William Baude, Originalism as a Constraint on 
Judges, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 2213 (2017); D. A. Jeremy Telman, Originalism: A 
Thing Worth Doing . . ., 42 OHIO N. UNIV. L. REV. 529 (2016); Lawrence B. 
Solum, Originalism and the Unwritten Constitution, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1935; 
Larry Kramer, Two (More) Problems with Originalism, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 907 (2008). We also do not consider the merits of the different schools of 
originalism. For a discussion of evolving approaches to originalism, see 
generally Andrew Coan, Living Constitutional Theory, 67 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 
99 (2017); Matthew D. Bunker, Originalism 2.0 Meets the First Amendment: 
The “New Originalism,” Interpretive Methodology, and Freedom of Expression, 
17 COMM. L. & POL’Y 329 (2012). Nor do we join the question of whether the 
framing generation expected the Speech Clause to apply beyond the limited 
case of prior restraints or pre-publication licenses. There is also a rich body of 
literature that seeks to understand the original meaning of the Speech Clause. 
See Bunker, supra, at 333–42 (discussing challenges in applying new 
originalism to the Speech Clause); Jud Campbell, Natural Rights and the First 
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the First Amendment only applies to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and was not held to do so until 1925.18 
Therefore, it is quite unclear why an originalist would look, as 
Judge Ikuta did, to the 1790s, rather than the 1860s, to 
determine the constitutionality of compelled state health and 
safety warning laws.19 
Second, and more fundamentally, Judge Ikuta’s “public 
health originalism” seems to rely on a significant 
misapprehension of earlier notions of the police power and its 
relation to the regulation of speech. Although the specific 
warning labels at issue in American Beverage were certainly not 
extant in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries, health and 
safety laws were more commonplace than we might suspect.20 
Moreover, mandated warning laws existed at the time, and 
there is no evidence that they were seen as clashing, in the 
modern sense, with individual liberties.21 To the contrary, 
liberty, including the freedom of expression, was widely 
understood as inherently limited by the common good,22 as 
exemplified by the common law maxims of sic utere23 and salus 
 
Amendment, 127 YALE L.J. 246, 249–51 (2017) (discussing the scholarly 
literature applicable to the original meaning of the Speech Clause). 
 18. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (holding the First 
Amendment right to free speech is applicable to the states via the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
 19. See Bunker, supra note 17, at 336 (emphasizing the need for 
originalists to look not only at the original framing period in the late 
eighteenth century, but also to the framing era of the Fourteenth Amendment 
in 1868 when determining such matters). 
 20. See Wendy E. Parmet, Health Care and the Constitution: Public 
Health and the Role of the State in the Framing Era, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
267, 285–302 (1993) (providing an overview of the status of public physical 
health law in the American colonies and during the confederation and early 
federalist eras). 
 21. See Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 85 (1851) 
(explaining that individual rights are constrained by “all manner of 
wholesome and reasonable laws . . . for the good and welfare” of the state). 
 22. See Campbell, supra note 17, at 246 (“Speech and press freedoms 
referred, in part, to natural rights that were expansive in scope but weak in 
their legal effect, allowing for restrictions of expression to promote the public 
good.”).  
 23. See Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) at 86 (conceptualizing the police power 
as a means of enforcing a common law maxim governing the law of 
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populi.24 Indeed, in both the 1780s and 1860s the police power 
was viewed as enabling states to compel warnings without 
violating any individual right.25 Or, to put it another way, the 
baseline assumption was that states could impose restraints on 
individuals, including with respect to speech, in the name of 
health and safety.26 
We conclude Part II by examining the provenance and role 
of the type of warning laws that now face First Amendment 
jeopardy. Although mandated warning laws have a long 
pedigree, they have no doubt proliferated in recent decades.27 
Paradoxically, they have done so in part because of concerns for 
individual liberties, including those protected by the First 
Amendment. Before the Supreme Court applied the First 
Amendment to commercial speech,28 jurisdictions had greater 
leeway to ban advertisements of products they deemed 
misleading or dangerous.29 As the twentieth century progressed, 
 
nuisance— sic utere tuo, ut alienum non lædas—use your own property in such 
a way that you do not injure other people’s). 
 24. See WENDY E. PARMET, POPULATIONS, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE LAW 
37–39 (2009) (recognizing the meaning of the common law maxim salus populi 
suprema lex—the health or well-being of the people is the supreme law). 
 25. Prior to the Civil War, a warning law imposed by the federal 
government would have raised alarms on federalism, rather than First 
Amendment, grounds. Until the Progressive Era, the protection of health and 
safety within a state was widely viewed as within the provenance of the states. 
See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 62 (1872) (noting that 
a state’s power to regulate for the health and safety of its citizens “is, in its 
essential nature, one which has been, up to the present period in the 
constitutional history of this country, always conceded to belong to the 
States”). 
 26. See Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, No Arbitrary Power: An 
Originalist Theory of the Due Process of Law, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1599, 
1663–66 (2019) (discussing the origins of the police power before 1868). 
 27. See infra Part II.  
 28. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822 (1975) (deciding that the 
First Amendment applied to advertisements for abortion because the ads 
“contained factual material of clear ‘public interest’”). 
 29. See WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION 
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 191–234 (1996) (discussing expansive 
public limitations on private activity concerning public health, including 
medical police, quarantines, and noxious trades); Wendy E. Parmet, From 
Slaughter-House to Lochner: The Rise and Fall of the Constitutionalization of 
Public Health, 40 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 476, 481–501 (1996) (discussing the 
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such measures increasingly came to be seen as inappropriately 
paternalistic and incompatible with freedom of expression.30 In 
their place, jurisdictions turned to warning labels that seemed 
to be a less paternalistic alternative.31 What happens if health 
and safety laws are no longer considered the less restrictive 
alternative? We argue that policymakers may, to industry’s 
chagrin, turn at times to more draconian alternatives. If so, 
public health originalism may paradoxically push us closer to 
an earlier, more paternalistic approach to protecting public 
 
evolution of public health’s place in police power jurisprudence from 1868 to 
1905). 
 30. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 497 (1996) 
(stating that the Court’s commercial speech decisions reject “a State’s 
paternalistic assumption that the public will use truthful, nonmisleading 
commercial information unwisely”); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 768 (1976) (rebuffing the state’s 
argument that consumers would make irresponsible choices if they were able 
to choose between higher priced but higher quality pharmaceuticals 
accompanied by high quality prescription monitoring services resulting from 
a “stable pharmacist-customer relationship”). For a discussion of the role of 
anti-paternalism in the Court’s commercial speech jurisprudence, see Dale 
Carpenter, The Antipaternalism Principle in the First Amendment, 37 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 579, 587–606 (2004) (reviewing First Amendment 
jurisprudence where the Court evinces, either explicitly or implicitly, some 
aversion to paternalism); Robert Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, 117 W. 
VA. L. REV. 867, 883 (2015). In the early days of the administrative state, 
command and control regulations were common and routine. But as we have 
learned more about the complexities of the marketplace, as we have acquired 
greater respect for the autonomy of marketplace actors, there has been a 
marked shift toward forms of regulation that force the disclosure of 
information believed necessary for educated participation in the marketplace. 
 31. See Lisa A. Robinson et al., Efficient Warnings, Not “Wolf or Puppy” 
Warnings, in THE FUTURE OF RISK MANAGEMENT 227–50 (Howard Kunreuther 
et al. eds., 2019) (discussing the history of warning laws and noting that they 
are “less intrusive than command and control regulations”); Cass R. Sunstein, 
The Storrs Lectures: Behavioral Economics and Paternalism, 122 YALE L.J. 
1826, 1826 (2013) (“While hard forms of paternalism cannot be ruled out of 
bounds, a general principle of behaviorally informed regulation—its first and 
only law—is that the appropriate responses to behavioral market failures 
usually consist of nudges, generally in the form of disclosures, warnings, and 
default rules.”); M. Gregg Bloche, Obesity and the Struggle with Ourselves, 93 
GEO. L.J. 1335, 1357 (2005) (arguing that with warnings the “paternalism here 
is a minor intrusion, since mere warnings, as opposed to outright bans (or 
liability for defective design) permit consumers to choose and make them 
responsible for their decisions”).  
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health, for example, by banning activities rather than 
compelling that they come with warning labels.32 
Part III returns to NIFLA, providing an interpretation that 
is consistent with First Amendment doctrine and theory as well 
as federal and state interests in protecting public health. The 
NIFLA majority itself seemed aware of the potentially 
far-reaching effects of the deregulatory approach.33 Thus, it 
attempted to cabin its own reasoning at several points during 
the opinion, including with the assertion that “[l]ongstanding 
torts for professional malpractice” are not in jeopardy and “the 
requirement that a doctor obtain informed consent to perform 
an operation is ‘firmly entrenched in American tort law.’”34 
Moreover, in an attempt to defuse the dissent’s skepticism, the 
majority declared that it “do[es] not question the legality of 
health and safety warnings long considered permissible, or 
purely factual and uncontroversial disclosures about 
commercial products.”35 But these raw assertions are 
unsupported by analysis.36 
We suggest that, given the interests underlying public 
health warnings and the corresponding First Amendment 
interests of listeners, NIFLA must be read narrowly. Indeed, 
seen in conjunction with Supreme Court precedent in Reed v. 
Town of Gilbert37 and Sorrell v. IMS Health,38 the Court’s 
 
 32. See Shanor, supra note 1, at 198–99 (“Greater protections for 
commercial speech may therefore reduce the role of many of the tools of 
behavioral law and economics based regulation—either producing 
deregulatory outcomes or, paradoxically, incentivizing mandates.”). 
 33. Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 2361, 
2376 (2018) (“Contrary to the suggestion in the dissent, we do not question the 
legality of health and safety warnings long considered permissible, or purely 
factual and uncontroversial disclosures about commercial products.”). 
 34. Id. at 2373. 
 35. Id. at 2376. 
 36. Id. at 2381 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“But this generally phrased 
disclaimer would seem more likely to invite litigation than to provide needed 
limitation and clarification.”); see Haupt, supra note 10, at 190 (“[T]he 
majority, without further explanation, assumes malpractice liability and 
informed consent to be constitutional under the First Amendment.”). 
 37. 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). 
 38. 564 U.S. 552 (2011). 
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expansive view of commercial speech doctrine is increasingly 
divorced from context.39 When public health interests are at 
stake, this acontextual understanding of the First Amendment 
results in a stark mismatch between theory and doctrine for “the 
Constitution values different kinds of speech for different 
reasons.”40 The doctrinal framework governing specific kinds of 
speech must reflect those reasons. Public health and safety 
warnings are a case in point. 
I. CONTEMPORARY COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND PUBLIC 
HEALTH WARNINGS 
Commercial speech doctrine remains contested and in flux. 
Although some scholars argued earlier that commercial speech 
should be protected by the First Amendment,41 the Supreme 
Court did not do so until 1976.42 Since then, the Court’s 
doctrinal approach towards commercial speech has been 
inconsistent.43 The following discussion reviews the broad 
doctrinal contours against which the American Beverage 
litigation was set. 
Traditionally, the starting point for commercial speech 
analysis has been the intermediate scrutiny inquiry set out in 
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service 
 
 39. See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2222 (holding that content-based regulations 
must satisfy strict scrutiny); Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 563, 571 (suggesting that 
more scrutiny of laws regulating commercial speech might be warranted, at 
least when the laws in question were “content- and speaker-based”). 
 40. Post, supra note 30, at 871. 
 41. See Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: 
Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
429, 443–48 (1971) (arguing that commercial speech cannot be distinguished 
from any category of protected speech in its capacity to provide the public with 
information that is relevant both to people’s personal lives and to their 
political decisions or in any other constitutionally relevant dimension). 
 42. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (striking down a state law that barred pharmacists 
from advertising the price of drugs and holding that commercial speech is 
protected by the First Amendment). 
 43. See, e.g., Post, supra note 1, at 2 (describing commercial speech 
doctrine as “a notoriously unstable and contentious domain of First 
Amendment jurisprudence.”). 
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Commission.44 But while that case, as well as the Supreme 
Court’s earlier discussion of commercial speech in Virginia State 
Board of Pharmacy,45 reviewed laws that limited commercial 
speech, Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel46 established 
the Court’s approach for reviewing laws that require 
commercial speakers “to provide somewhat more information 
than they might otherwise be inclined to present.”47 At issue in 
Zauderer was a law compelling an attorney to “include in his 
advertising purely factual and uncontroversial information 
about the terms under which his services will be available.”48 
Noting a distinction between “disclosure requirements and 
outright prohibitions on speech,”49 the Court recognized a lower, 
rational basis standard for the former, holding “that an 
advertiser’s rights are adequately protected as long as 
disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State’s 
interest in preventing deception of consumers.”50 
In the years since the Court issued that admonition, lower 
courts have struggled to determine both when Zauderer’s lower 
level of scrutiny was applicable, and the degree of protection 
afforded to disclosure laws.51 Indeed, the federal appellate 
courts fundamentally disagree about the types of disclosures to 
which Zauderer applies. While one set of circuit court decisions 
limits Zauderer to speech designed to redress consumer 
 
 44. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 
557, 566 (1980) (requiring that commercial speech regulations be subjected to 
intermediate scrutiny when determining constitutionality); see also Note, 
Repackaging Zauderer, 130 HARV. L. REV. 972, 974–76 (2017) (detailing lower 
courts’ application of Zauderer to analyze commercial warnings and 
disclosures). This Note also provides a brief overview of the doctrinal 
development from Virginia Pharmacy to Zauderer. Id. 
 45. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
 46. 471 U.S. 626 (1985). 
 47. Id. at 650. 
 48. Id. at 651. 
 49. Id. at 650. 
 50. Id. at 651. 
 51. See, e.g., Repackaging Zauderer, supra note 44, at 979 (“Zauderer’s 
treatment in various circuits most closely resembles a fractured, frequently 
contradictory mosaic.”); Eugene Volokh, The Law of Compelled Speech, 97 TEX. 
L. REV. 355, 357 (2018) (noting that compelled speech doctrine “contains major 
uncertainties” due to the doctrine’s internal tensions). 
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deception,52 a group of sister circuits have applied Zauderer’s 
more deferential review to laws compelling the disclosure of 
consumer information in general.53   
In this Part, we first provide a chronological overview of the 
most important doctrinal developments immediately preceding 
American Beverage, focusing on three particularly relevant 
cases: the D.C. Circuit’s 2012 decision in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
Co. v. FDA,54 the same court’s 2014 decision in American Meat 
Institute v. USDA (AMI),55 and the Ninth Circuit’s 2017 decision 
in CTIA–The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley.56 We then focus 
on the Ninth Circuit’s 2017 (pre-NIFLA) panel57 and its 2019 
 
 52. See, e.g., Dwyer v. Cappell, 762 F.3d 275, 284 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(suggesting that Zauderer applies only to disclosures aimed at preventing 
consumer deception); Ent. Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 653 
(7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Zauderer as authorizing disclaimers aimed at 
preventing deception but without providing any analysis); United States v. 
Wenger, 427 F.3d 840, 849 (10th Cir. 2005) (same).  
 53. See, e.g., Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. (AMI), 760 F.3d 18, 22 
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (noting that Zauderer “seems inherently applicable 
beyond the problem of deception”); Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United 
States, 674 F.3d 509, 554 (6th Cir. 2012) (“If a commercial-speech disclosure 
requirement fits within the framework of Zauderer and its progeny, then we 
apply a rational-basis standard.”); Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 
294, 316 (1st Cir. 2005) (describing Zauderer as “akin to the general rational 
basis test governing all government regulations under the Due Process 
Clause”); Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 114–15 (2d Cir. 2001)  
Mandating that commercial actors disclose commercial information 
ordinarily does not offend the important . . . interests that lie at the 
heart of the First Amendment. The Amendment is satisfied, 
therefore, by a rational connection between the purpose of 
commercial disclosure requirement and the means employed to 
realize that purpose. 
 54. 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 55. 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 56. 854 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2017), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018). After 
the American Beverage II en banc decision was handed down, a panel of the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed CTIA on remand, 928 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2019). We 
return to this latest decision in CTIA in Part III infra. 
 57. Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco (American 
Beverage I), 871 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 2017). 
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(post-NIFLA) en banc58 decisions in American Beverage, and 
discuss how the Ninth Circuit responded to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in NIFLA, which was decided between the time that the 
circuit court issued its panel and en banc decisions. The 
doctrinal shift that NIFLA suggested caused disagreement 
among the en banc opinions in American Beverage II and laid 
the groundwork for Judge Ikuta’s turn to public health 
originalism.  
A.  Compelled Warnings and the Role of History 
In order to fully appreciate the doctrinal meanderings 
throughout the American Beverage litigation, three cases 
involving compelled warnings seem particularly salient. First, 
in 2012 in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, the D.C. Circuit 
held that a set of new FDA-proposed warning labels, 
implementing a requirement of the 2009 Family Smoking 
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, violated the First 
Amendment because the agency failed to present evidence that 
the warnings would lead to a reduction in smoking rates and 
thus failed to meet the scrutiny required by Central Hudson.59 
R.J. Reynolds illustrates the clash between the government’s 
power to demand “that consumers be fully informed about the 
dangers of hazardous products”60 and the protection commercial 
speech doctrine provides commercial entities against being 
forced to warn about their own product.61 Importantly for our 
purposes, the court rejected application of the Zauderer 
framework62 arguing that its less stringent approach to First 
Amendment review was applicable only when the disclosure 
 
 58. Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco (American 
Beverage II), 916 F.3d 749 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc). 
 59. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1222.  
 60. Id. at 1212. 
 61. See id. (“[H]ow much leeway should this Court grant the government 
when it seeks to compel a product’s manufacturer to convey the state’s 
subjective—and perhaps even ideological—view that consumers should reject 
this otherwise legal, but disfavored, product?”). 
 62. See id. at 1217 (“[T]he images fall outside the ambit of Zauderer.”). 
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mandate was needed to remedy deception.63 In addition, the 
court held that the graphic warnings “do not constitute the type 
of ‘purely factual and uncontroversial’ information” to which 
Zauderer applies.64 In so doing, the court seemed to reread 
Zauderer as limiting its lesser review to statements that are 
factual and noncontroversial, a point that was not clear in the 
Supreme Court’s opinion.  
Once having rejected Zauderer’s rational basis standard, 
the court in R.J. Reynolds went on to apply Central Hudson’s 
intermediate scrutiny in a way that placed a high demand on 
the evidence presented, requiring the government to show that 
the warnings would in fact result in reduced smoking rates.65 
The decision also hinted at the history of industry acceptance of 
warnings in general,66 but held that  only warnings that are “a 
remedial measure designed to counteract specific deceptive 
claims” would have placed them in Zauderer’s ambit.67  
In a 2014 decision, American Meat Institute v. USDA (AMI), 
the D.C. Circuit addressed the constitutionality of compelled 
country-of-origin disclosures on meat products.68 There, the 
court held “that Zauderer in fact does reach beyond problems of 
deception, sufficiently to encompass the disclosure mandates at 
issue” in that case.69 So holding, the court explicitly overruled 
R.J. Reynolds’ ruling that Zauderer applied only when 
 
 63. See id. at 1213–17 (“[B]y its own terms, Zauderer’s holding is limited 
to cases in which disclosure requirements are ‘reasonably related to the State’s 
interest in preventing deception of consumers.’ Zauderer ‘carries no authority 
for a mandate unrelated to the interest in avoiding misleading or incomplete 
commercial messages.’” (citations omitted)).  
 64. Id. at 1216.  
 65. Id. at 1217–21. 
 66. See id. at 1215 (“The Companies have never argued that no disclosure 
requirements are warranted; they merely object to the form and content of the 
specific requirements proposed by the FDA. . . . Moreover, the Companies 
generally acknowledge the need for effective warnings.”). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. (AMI), 760 F.3d 18, 22 (D.C. 
Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
 69. Id. at 20. 
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disclosures remedied deception.70 Moreover, in assessing the 
governmental interest in country-of-origin disclosures, the court 
noted that this information “has an historical pedigree that lifts 
it well above ‘idle curiosity.’”71 The court further explained that 
“country-of-origin label mandates indeed have a ‘long history.’ 
Congress has been imposing similar mandates since 1890, 
giving such rules a run just short of 125 years.”72 This is relevant 
for the First Amendment inquiry, the court argued, because it 
signals the value of the information to the consumer.73 
Moreover, such disclosure requirements tend to have a long, 
constitutionally uncontroversial history.74 
Then-Judge Kavanaugh, concurring in the judgment, 
likewise emphasized the longstanding character of 
country-of-origin designations.75 With respect to determining 
which state interests are sufficient to justify compelled 
disclosures, he noted that “[h]ere, as elsewhere in First 
 
 70. Id. at 22–23 (“To the extent that other cases in this circuit may be 
read as holding to the contrary and limiting Zauderer to cases in which the 
government points to an interest in correcting deception, we now overrule 
them.”).  
 71. Id. at 23. 
 72. Id.; see Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (finding 
adequate justification for applying strict scrutiny in “a long history, a 
substantial consensus, and simple common sense”); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, 
Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 628–29 (1995) (same). 
 73. See AMI, 760 F.3d at 24 (“The Congress that extended 
country-of-origin mandates to food did so against a historical backdrop that 
has made the value of this particular product information to consumers a 
matter of common sense.”). 
 74. See id. at 26 
The self-evident tendency of a disclosure mandate to assure that 
recipients get the mandated information may in part explain why, 
where that is the goal, many such mandates have persisted for 
decades without anyone questioning their constitutionality. In this 
long-lived group have been not only country-of-origin labels but also 
many other routine disclosure mandates about product attributes, 
including, for instance, disclosures of fiber content, care 
instructions for clothing items, and listing of ingredients. (internal 
citations omitted). 
 75. See id. at 30 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“For many decades, 
Congress has mandated such country-of-origin labels for a variety of 
products.”). 
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Amendment free speech law, history and tradition are reliable 
guides.”76 But whereas mandated disclosures “to prevent 
consumer deception or to ensure consumer health or safety” 
including nutrition labels and health warnings reflect a justified 
state interest, “a country-of-origin disclosure requirement 
obviously does not serve those interests.”77 Judge Kavanaugh 
nevertheless found the justification in the “historically rooted  
interest in supporting American manufacturers, farmers, and 
ranchers as they compete with foreign manufacturers, farmers, 
and ranchers.”78 He thus concluded that the “historical pedigree 
is critical for First Amendment purposes and demonstrates that 
the Government’s interest here is substantial.”79 Ultimately, 
while both the AMI majority and the Kavanaugh concurrence 
invoked the disclosures’ historical pedigree, neither inquired 
whether such disclosures existed in 1791, making their 
approach fundamentally different than Judge Ikuta’s public 
health originalism. 
In contrast, Judge Brown’s AMI dissent challenged the 
historical perspective, noting that “in the First Amendment 
context, which has been steadily evolving since the late 1800s, 
history is not ‘telling’; rather, it is an especially poor substitute 
for reasoned judgment.”80 She specifically rejected the idea “that 
a time-tested consensus can be a proxy for the substantiality of 
the government’s interest in the First Amendment context.”81 
Indeed, she concluded, “[i]f that were true, the commercial 
speech doctrine would never have developed at all.”82 The 
change over time in the doctrinal treatment of commercial 
 
 76. Id. at 31. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 32 (further noting that “[s]ince the early days of the Republic, 
numerous U.S. laws have sought to further that interest, sometimes overtly 
and sometimes subtly”). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 48 (Brown, J., dissenting). 
 81. Id. at 50. 
 82. Id.  
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speech means that “citation to early labeling regimes tells us 
nothing useful.”83 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit offered perhaps its most relevant 
interpretation of Zauderer prior to American Beverage (and 
prior to NIFLA) in its 2017 decision, CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n v. 
City of Berkeley.84 CTIA concerned the City of Berkeley’s 
requirement that cell phone sellers provide a warning about cell 
phone safety, as originally determined by the FCC based on its 
findings.85 To analyze the disclosure, the court for the first time 
addressed whether Zauderer applies to commercial speech 
without the goal of preventing consumer deception.86 Agreeing 
with the D.C. Circuit’s approach in AMI and that of several 
sister circuits, the Ninth Circuit held that it does.87 In so doing, 
the court quoted language from AMI noting the “historical 
pedigree” of country-of-origin information,88 though it did not 
rely on historical pedigree to uphold the cell phone safety 
disclosures. Rather, CTIA treated Zauderer as a true form of 
 
 83. Id. at 49.; see id. (noting further “[t]hat ‘Congress has been imposing 
[country-of-origin] mandates since 1890,’ eighty-six years before commercial 
speech received explicit protection, thus tells us very little about the practice’s 
constitutionality” (quoting the majority opinion)). 
 84. See generally CTIA–The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 854 F.3d 
1105 (9th Cir. 2017), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018), remanded, 928 F.3d 832 
(9th Cir. 2019). After the American Beverage II en banc decision was handed 
down, a panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed CTIA on remand. We return to 
this latest decision in CTIA in Part III infra. 
 85. CTIA–The Wireless Ass’n, 854 F.3d at 1114 (challenging the FCC’s 
requirement to warn prospective purchasers about exposure to 
radio-frequency radiation). 
 86. Id. at 1116 (“This is the first time we have had occasion in this circuit 
to squarely address the question whether, in the absence of a 
prevention-of-deception rationale, the Zauderer compelled-disclosure test 
applies.”). 
 87. Id. at 1114. (“Several of our sister circuits . . . have answered this 
question. They have unanimously concluded that the Zauderer exception for 
compelled speech applies even in circumstances where the disclosure does not 
protect against deceptive speech.”). 
 88. Id. at 1117 (citing Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. (AMI), 760 
F.3d 18, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc)). 
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rational basis review.89 The Supreme Court later vacated this 
decision in light of NIFLA, and we will return to it in Part IV.90  
B.  The American Beverage Litigation in Context 
The American Beverage litigation involved a San Francisco 
ordinance that attempted to address increases in obesity and 
other conditions related to consuming sugary beverages.91 The 
ordinance required certain disclosures on advertisements for 
sugary beverages, including the warning that drinking such 
beverages “contributes to obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay.”92 
The required warning had to cover at least 20 percent of the 
ad.93  
Determining that the speech at issue was commercial 
speech, the district court analyzed the warning requirement 
 
 89. See id. at 1118 (“Under Zauderer, compelled disclosure of commercial 
speech complies with the First Amendment if the information in the disclosure 
is reasonably related to a substantial governmental interest and is purely 
factual.”). 
 90. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 91. See Cara B. Ebbeling et al., A Randomized Trial of Sugar-Sweetened 
Beverages and Adolescent Body Weight, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1407, 1407–16 
(2012) (finding that consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages may cause 
excessive weight gain). See generally Maira Bes-Rastrollo et al., 
Sugar-Sweetened Beverages and Weight Gain in Children and Adults: A 
Systematic Review from 2013–2015 and a Comparison with Previous Studies, 
10 OBESITY FACTS 674 (2018) (suggesting that sugar-sweetened beverage 
consumption is positively associated with or has an effect on obesity in 
children and adults); Amelie Keller & Sophie Bucher Della Torre, 
Sugar-Sweetened Beverages and Obesity Among Children and Adolescents: A 
Review of Systematic Literature Reviews, 11 CHILDHOOD OBESITY 338 (2015) 
(concluding that there was a direct association between sugar-sweetened 
beverage consumption and weight gain and obesity in children and 
adolescents). 
 92. See Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 187 F. Supp. 
3d 1123, 1126 (N.D. Cal. 2016) 
In essence, the ordinance requires certain kinds of advertisements 
related to sugar-sweetened beverages . . . to display a warning from 
the City that says: “WARNING: Drinking beverages with added 
sugar(s) contributes to obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay. This is a 
message from the City and County of San Francisco.” S.F. Health 
Code § 4203(a). 
 93. Id. at 1130.  
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under Zauderer94 and concluded that both the tooth decay95 and 
the diabetes/obesity warning,96 were likely constitutional under 
its less stringent standard of review.97 Moreover, the district 
court determined that the asserted chilling effect on speech was 
insufficiently substantiated,98 and, in any event, “Zauderer 
dictates that a compelled disclosure need only be reasonably 
related to the government’s interest in order for the advertiser’s 
rights to be adequately protected.”99 This treated Zauderer as a 
straightforward rational basis requirement. 
But a panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the 
warning requirements imposed “an ‘unjustified or unduly 
burdensome disclosure requirement that might offend the First 
Amendment by chilling protected commercial speech.’”100 
Writing for the panel majority, Judge Ikuta concluded that the 
ordinance was unduly burdensome and chilled speech.101 The 
panel also held that “the ordinance was not purely factual and 
 
 94. See id. at 1133–36 (“Because commercial speech is at issue in this 
facial challenge, and the challenged ordinance requires disclosure rather than 
suppression of speech, strict scrutiny is not required under Zauderer . . . . ”). 
 95. See id. at 1136–39 (“[T]hat the warning that drinking SSBs 
‘contributes’ to tooth decay is likely factual and accurate. The City has a 
legitimate interest in public health and safety, and the warning that SSBs 
contribute to tooth decay is reasonably related to the City’s interest in public 
health and safety.” (quoting Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns., 471 U.S. 
626, 651 (1985))).  
 96. See id. at 1139–42  
[I]t is likely the City’s mandated warning . . . is factual and 
accurate, and the City had a reasonable basis for identifying SSBs 
as a cause. The City has a legitimate interest in public health and 
safety, and the warning that SSBs contribute to obesity and 
diabetes is reasonably related to the City’s interest in public health 
and safety, particularly in light of the evidence indicating that SSBs 
are a significant source of calories as well as a significant source of 
added sugar. 
 97. Id. at 1142. 
 98. Id. at 1142–45.  
 99. Id. at 1145. 
 100. Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco (American 
Beverage I), 871 F.3d 884, 888 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Zauderer v. Off. of 
Disciplinary Couns., 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)). 
 101. Id. at 897. 
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uncontroversial.”102 This analysis reveals Judge Ikuta’s 
approach to Zauderer before NIFLA was decided. She noted 
that, at the time, “[t]he Supreme Court has not yet considered 
whether the Zauderer framework applies when a state requires 
disclosures for a different state interest, such as to promote 
public health.”103 Nonetheless, she found, in accordance with 
Ninth Circuit precedent104 and that of several sister circuits, 
that the Zauderer framework “applies beyond the context of 
preventing consumer deception.”105 The crux of the analysis was 
whether the information conveyed was “purely factual and 
uncontroversial.”106 Judge Ikuta concluded that the disclosures 
required by San Francisco were not, therefore they violated the 
First Amendment.107 In particular she noted, “a literally true 
but misleading disclosure creates the possibility of consumer 
deception.”108 
The panel’s conclusion echoed the D.C. Circuit’s R.J. 
Reynolds decision, which signaled a tightening review of what 
“purely factual and uncontroversial” means.109 In AMI, the D.C. 
Circuit did not doubt that country-of-origin information was 
“purely factual and uncontroversial.”110 But Judge Kavanaugh 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 892. 
 104. Id. at 893 (citing CTIA–The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 854 
F.3d 1105, 1117 (9th Cir. 2017)).  
 105. Id. at 892 (citing decisions by the First, Second, Sixth, Ninth and D.C. 
circuits).  
 106. Id. at 892–93. 
 107. Id. at 895–97. 
 108. Id. at 893. (quoting CTIA–The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 854 
F.3d 1105, 1119 (9th Cir. 2017)). 
 109. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1216–17 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012) (rejecting the graphic cigarette warnings in that case as not falling 
within this category, due in part to their largely emotional appeal). Judge 
Rogers rejected this view. She concluded that “the warning labels present 
factually accurate information and address misleading commercial speech, as 
defined in Supreme Court precedent.” Id. at 1222 (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
 110. Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. (AMI), 760 F.3d 18, 26–27 (D.C. 
Cir. 2014) (“The self-evident tendency of a disclosure mandate to assure that 
recipients get the mandated information may in part explain why, where that 
is the goal, many such mandates have persisted for decades without anyone 
questioning their constitutionality.”) 
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noted that it is not entirely clear what exactly “uncontroversial” 
means.111 In contrast to the disclosures in R.J. Reynolds, the 
country-of-origin information, he asserted, “cannot be 
considered ‘controversial’” and he cited “the historical pedigree” 
of the disclosure requirement among his reasons for upholding 
it.112 This interpretation infused the “uncontroversial” 
requirement of Zauderer with a historical inquiry as to the 
specific disclosure. In contrast, Judge Ikuta’s interpretation of 
“uncontroversial” seems to imply that there must be an absence 
of debate, that is, a warning is controversial if it is disputed.113  
San Francisco’s ordinance, she also found, was not factually 
accurate because it was unqualified.114 Rather than stating 
“that overconsumption of sugar-sweetened beverages 
contributes to obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay, or that 
consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages may contribute to 
obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay,” the warning implied that 
drinking would contribute to the conditions noted.115 Moreover, 
the warning did not take the role of sugary beverages in an 
otherwise balanced diet into account.116 Thus, “the accuracy of 
 
 111. Id. at 34 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“To be sure, determining 
whether a disclosure is ‘uncontroversial’ may be difficult in some compelled 
commercial speech cases, in part because it is unclear how we should assess 
and what we should examine to determine whether a mandatory disclosure is 
controversial.”). 
 112. Id.  
But regardless of how the “uncontroversial” requirement might 
play out in other cases, the issue poses little difficulty here. Unlike 
the mandated disclosures at issue in R.J. Reynolds . . . a 
country-of-origin label cannot be considered “controversial” given 
the factually straightforward, evenhanded, and readily understood 
nature of the information, as well as the historical pedigree of this 
specific kind of disclosure requirement. 
 113. See Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco (American 
Beverage I), 871 F.3d 884, 893 (9th Cir. 2017) (stating that a disclosure that is 
true but omits key information about terms can be misleading and create the 
possibility of deception). 
 114. Id. at 895. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See id.  
Although San Francisco’s experts state that “there is a clear 
scientific consensus” that sugar-sweetened beverages contribute to 
obesity and diabetes through “excessive caloric intake” and “by 
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the warning is in reasonable dispute.”117 Finally, she noted, the 
warning does not apply to other products containing sugar, 
instead singling out sugar-sweetened beverages.118 Thus, she 
concluded, “rather than being ‘purely factual and 
uncontroversial,’” the warning requires the Associations to 
convey San Francisco’s disputed policy views.”119 
Concurring in the judgment, Judge Nelson rejected the 
“tenuous conclusion that the warning’s language is 
controversial and misleading.”120 Rather, she would have 
reversed based on the city’s failure to demonstrate “that the 
twenty percent requirement at issue here would not deter 
certain entities from advertising in their medium of choice.”121 
The en banc majority shared this concern,122 but its subsequent 
analysis was complicated by NIFLA. 
C.  Enter NIFLA 
After the panel decision was handed down in American 
Beverage I, the Supreme Court decided NIFLA. The NIFLA 
 
adding extra calories to the diet,” the experts do not directly 
challenge the conclusion of the Associations’ expert that “when 
consumed as part of a diet that balances caloric intake with energy 
output, consuming beverages with added sugar does not contribute 
to obesity or diabetes.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 117. Id.  
 118. Id.  
The warning is required exclusively on advertisements for 
sugar-sweetened beverages, and not on advertisements for other 
products with equal or greater amounts of added sugars and 
calories. By focusing on a single product, the warning conveys the 
message that sugar-sweetened beverages are less healthy than 
other sources of added sugars and calories and are more likely to 
contribute to obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay than other foods. 
This message is deceptive in light of the current state of research 
on this issue. (emphasis added). 
 119. Id. at 896. 
 120. Id. at 899 (Nelson, J., concurring). 
 121. Id. 
 122. See Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco (American 
Beverage II), 916 F.3d 749, 757 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (“On this record, 
therefore, the 20% requirement is not justified and is unduly burdensome 
when balanced against its likely burden on protected speech.”). 
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decision’s gloss on Zauderer, in turn, resulted in a fractured en 
banc analysis in American Beverage II. So what exactly 
happened in NIFLA that caused such fracturing? 
NIFLA concerned a California statute requiring two types 
of compelled disclosures at crisis pregnancy centers (CPCs).123 
The first, to be posted at licensed facilities, required information 
about the existence of free or low-cost family planning programs 
in the state.124 The second, to be posted at unlicensed facilities, 
stated that the facility was not a licensed medical facility.125 
Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, rejected the application 
of Zauderer to the first,126 but assumed its applicability to the 
second.127 Despite this assumption, the Court concluded that 
disclosure applicable to unlicensed facilities was “unduly 
burdensome” and thus unconstitutional under Zauderer.128 
In the context of the licensed facility disclosure, Justice 
Thomas characterized Zauderer as applying to “laws that 
require professionals to disclose factual, noncontroversial 
information in their ‘commercial speech’”129 and as “govern[ing] 
only ‘commercial advertising’ and requir[ing] the disclosure of 
‘purely factual and uncontroversial information about the terms 
under which . . . services will be available.’”130 He concluded 
that Zauderer was inapplicable to the licensed facility 
disclosures, because the disclosures were of neither purely 
factual information about the terms of service nor were they 
 
 123. See Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 
2361, 2368 (2018) (“[T]he FACT Act imposes two notice requirements on 
facilities that provide pregnancy-related services—one for licensed facilities 
and one for unlicensed facilities.”).  
 124. See id. (“Licensed clinics must notify women that California provides 
free or low-cost services.”).  
 125. See id. (“Unlicensed clinics must notify women that California has not 
licensed the clinics to provide medical services.”). 
 126. Id. at 2372. 
 127. See id. at 2378 (“[T]he unlicensed notice does not satisfy Zauderer, 
assuming that standard applies.”). 
 128. Id. (“[W]e conclude that the unlicensed notice is unjustified and 
unduly burdensome under Zauderer.”). 
 129. Id. at 2372. 
 130. Id.  
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uncontroversial.131 Indeed, he reinterpreted the 
“uncontroversial” requirement so as to encompass the entire 
topic of abortion.132 In effect, according to Justice Thomas, even 
if the information itself was indisputable, it was controversial 
because it pertained to a procedure (abortion) that generated 
great controversy. By so doing, he went even further than the 
American Beverage I panel. Indeed, it seems that his 
interpretation of “uncontroversial” means that as long as a topic 
is broadly controversial (such as abortion),133 any information 
relating to it, even if it is factual and accurate (such as the 
existence of free or low-cost family planning programs in 
California), could be deemed controversial. Nevertheless, 
apparently in response to Justice Breyer’s claim, in his dissent, 
that the majority’s approach would threaten a wide swath of 
health and safety laws, Justice Thomas added that “[c]ontrary 
to the suggestion in the dissent, we do not question the legality 
of health and safety warnings long considered permissible, or 
purely factual and uncontroversial disclosures about 
commercial products.”134  
Where did the reference to “health and safety warnings long 
considered permissible” come from? Not from Zauderer, which 
contains no such discussion. Instead, while rejecting the notion 
that the law should be given greater leeway because it regulated 
professional speech, a category that Justice Thomas claimed the 
Court had never previously recognized for First Amendment 
purposes, Justice Thomas insisted that “[l]ongstanding torts for 
professional malpractice, for example, ‘fall within the 
traditional purview of state regulation of professional 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. (“The notice in no way relates to the services that licensed clinics 
provide. Instead, it requires these clinics to disclose information about 
state-sponsored services—including abortion, anything but an 
‘uncontroversial’ topic. Accordingly, Zauderer has no application here.”). 
 133. It seems worth noting, however, that the NIFLA majority gives no 
guidance whatsoever that would help lower courts to determine which topics, 
aside from abortion, are controversial in this sense. We return to this question 
in Part III. 
 134. Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 2361, 
2376 (2018); id. at 2379–81 (Breyer, J., dissenting). We discuss the dissent 
further in Part III. 
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conduct.’”135 Likewise, “the requirement that a doctor obtain 
informed consent to perform an operation is ‘firmly entrenched 
in American tort law.’”136 But beyond these doctrinal truisms, 
no further explanation of the “long considered permissible” 
justification for health and safety warnings can be found in the 
Court’s opinion in NIFLA. 
That lack of explanation created a challenge for the Ninth 
Circuit when it reconsidered American Beverage I for en banc 
review. As Judge Graber, writing for the American Beverage II 
en banc majority, explained, “NIFLA requires us to reexamine 
how we approach a First Amendment claim concerning 
compelled speech.”137 Nevertheless, she concluded that NIFLA 
did not actually abrogate the previous interpretation of 
Zauderer in the Ninth Circuit and its sister circuits upon which 
the American Beverage I panel had relied.138 Health and safety 
warnings, pre- and post-NIFLA, remain subject to Zauderer 
review because “NIFLA preserved the exception to heightened 
scrutiny for health and safety warnings.”139 And although the 
Supreme Court, post-NIFLA, had vacated the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in CTIA, the en banc majority continued to rely on that 
case.140 By contrast, Judge Ikuta, the author of the American 
Beverage I panel decision, read NIFLA as significantly 
 
 135. Id. at 2373 (majority opinion). 
 136. Id. Of course, these statements undermine the assertion that 
professional speech is not a distinctive form of speech. See Haupt, supra note 
10, at 189 (“[P]rofessional speech cannot logically be the same as other speech, 
yet be governed by a different doctrinal framework.”). 
 137. Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco (American 
Beverage II), 916 F.3d 749, 756 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc). 
 138. Id. (“[N]othing in NIFLA suggests that CTIA was wrongly 
decided . . . NIFLA did not address, and a fortiori did not disapprove, the 
circuits’ precedents, including CTIA, which have unanimously held that 
Zauderer applies outside the context of misleading advertisements.”). 
 139. Id. (“Zauderer provides the appropriate framework to analyze a First 
Amendment claim involving compelled commercial speech—even when the 
government requires health and safety warnings, rather than warnings to 
prevent the deception of consumers.”). 
 140. See id. at 755 (“We rejected the argument that intermediate 
scrutiny—as required by Central Hudson for situations in which speech is 
restricted or prohibited—should govern.” (citing CTIA–Wireless Ass’n v. City 
of Berkeley, 854 F.3d 1105, 1115–17 (9th Cir. 2017))). 
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modifying the Zauderer framework. We turn to the details of her 
analysis in Part II. 
In another concurrence, Judge Christensen and Chief 
Judge Thomas agreed with the majority that Zauderer applied, 
but returned to the question of whether the compelled warning 
was “purely factual.”141 A final concurrence by Judge Nguyen 
rejected application of Zauderer outside of false and misleading 
commercial speech and would instead have applied the 
intermediate scrutiny review of Central Hudson.142 She 
suggested that “it is the commercial message’s accuracy—not its 
completeness—that demarcates the boundary between Central 
Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny and Zauderer’s rational basis 
test.”143  
In short, the majority opinion and three concurrences in 
American Beverage II vividly illustrate the wide range of 
doctrinal uncertainty and resulting disagreement about the 
scope and nature of First Amendment review of compelled, 
commercial disclosures that existed both prior to and after 
NIFLA. The remainder of our discussion will focus on the “public 
health originalism” approach. 
II.  PUBLIC HEALTH ORIGINALISM, HISTORY, AND 
IMPLICATIONS 
The uncertainty created by NIFLA’s treatment of Zauderer 
opened the door for Judge Ikuta’s novel suggestion that the 
constitutionality of mandatory disclosure laws depends upon 
whether they were accepted as constitutional in 1791.144 In this 
Part we show why that approach is misguided. We begin by 
examining Judge Ikuta’s concurrence more closely, explaining 
how her use of history differs in significant ways from that of 
the Supreme Court. Next, we argue that whatever the general 
 
 141. Id. at 765 (Christen, J., concurring). 
 142. Id. at 767–68 (Nguyen, J., concurring). 
 143. Id. 
 144. See id. at 762 (Ikuta, J., concurring) (“The types of speech exempt 
from First Amendment protection are ‘well-defined and narrowly limited 
classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been 
thought to raise any Constitutional problem,’ from 1791 to present.” (quoting 
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–69 (2010))). 
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merits or flaws of originalism as a method for interpreting the 
Speech Clause, relying on 1791 as the critical date for 
determining the constitutionality of state health and safety 
warnings is deeply problematic. It also appears to misconceive 
the history of health and safety warning laws. Any serious 
originalist analysis of the subject must consider earlier 
conceptions of the police power and its relationship to individual 
liberty. In 1791, and probably also in 1868, the police power was 
widely accepted as limiting individual rights in order to advance 
health, safety, or morals.145 From that perspective, far from 
being viewed as an impermissible restraint on individual 
freedom, the mandated disclosure in American Beverage II, like 
many other contemporary disclosure laws, would have been 
viewed as a relatively uncontroversial exercise of the police 
power.146 Finally, we consider the potential impact of Judge 
Ikuta’s approach on the states’ ability to protect the public from 
unsafe products. By restricting states’ ability to mandate health 
and safety warnings, public health originalism may 
counter-intuitively drive states to consider more paternalistic 
measures.  
A.  Judge Ikuta’s Concurrence 
The role that public health originalism would confer to 
history in determining the constitutionality of compelled health 
and safety warnings is not entirely clear. Like the en banc 
majority, Judge Ikuta began her analysis by turning to 
NIFLA.147 NIFLA, she argues, “broke new ground” in several 
ways.148 First, it clarified “that government-compelled speech is 
 
 145. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 62 (1872) 
(discussing the nature and scope of health and safety regulations arising 
under the states’ police powers); Barnett & Bernick, supra note 26, at 1663– 66 
(discussing “the origins of the ‘police power’ before 1868”). 
 146. See infra notes 149–194 and accompanying text.  
 147. See Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco (American 
Beverage II), 916 F.3d 749, 758 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (Ikuta, J., concurring) 
(“In National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA), the 
Supreme Court provided a framework for analyzing First Amendment 
challenges to government-compelled speech.”).   
 148. Id.  
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a content-based regulation of speech.”149 Hence, such 
regulations “are presumptively unconstitutional and may be 
justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly 
tailored to serve compelling state interests.”150 Second, NIFLA 
commanded that “governments may not ‘impose content-based 
restrictions on speech without persuasive evidence of a long (if 
heretofore unrecognized) tradition to that effect.’”151  
After presenting this framework, Judge Ikuta concluded 
that San Francisco’s ordinance fails to qualify for the exemption 
from strict scrutiny provided by Zauderer because the warning 
was neither factual nor noncontroversial.152 Only after reaching 
that conclusion did she look to history.153 In so doing, she 
rejected the en banc majority’s claim that “NIFLA preserved the 
exception to heightened scrutiny for health and safety 
warnings,”154 arguing instead that “NIFLA made clear that only 
‘health and safety warnings long considered permissible’ would 
be excepted.”155 This statement suggests that Judge Ikuta saw 
the requirement of a historical pedigree as an additional 
demand, imposed on even those warnings that would otherwise 
qualify for Zauderer’s lower level of scrutiny. In other words, 
even if a mandated warning law qualified for Zauderer, it would 
not pass muster unless the state could also show that it was 
“long considered permissible.”156 
It is possible, however, that Judge Ikuta saw the “long 
permissible” requirement as offering an alternative to Zauderer. 
In effect, health and safety laws that would not otherwise merit 
 
 149. Id. at 759. This conclusion does not seem to be “new” in light of the 
Court’s decision in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 565 (2011) 
(holding that a Vermont statute regulating speech related to marketing of 
pharmaceuticals was “designed to impose a specific, content-based burden on 
protected expression”). 
 150. American Beverage II, 916 F.3d at 759 (internal quotations omitted) 
(citing Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 2361, 
2371 (2018)). 
 151. Id.   
 152. Id. at 761. 
 153. Id. at 762. 
 154. Id. at 756. 
 155. Id. at 762 (emphasis added). 
 156. See id.  
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Zauderer’s more lenient review might not require strict scrutiny 
if they were “long permissible.” For one thing, she discussed the 
test only after concluding that the ordinance did not merit an 
exemption under Zauderer.157 If a warning law had to pass both 
tests, Zauderer and the “long permissible” test, there would 
have been little reason to discuss the latter once the ordinance 
had failed the former. Moreover, Judge Ikuta’s statement that 
“only ‘health and safety warning laws long considered 
permissible’ would be excepted,” came in apparent response to 
the majority’s assertion that NIFLA “preserved the exception to 
heightened scrutiny for health and safety warning laws.”158 The 
majority reached that conclusion by referencing Justice Thomas’ 
response to Justice Breyer’s charge that the NIFLA majority’s 
opinion would threaten a wide array of health and safety 
laws.159 Thus although Justice Thomas did not clarify the 
relationship between Zauderer and the laws subject to his 
reassurance about the continued constitutionality of health and 
safety laws, it is certainly plausible that he meant to convey that 
there are some health and safety laws that may fail to qualify 
for Zauderer but may nevertheless be constitutional due to their 
long pedigree. Judge Ikuta may have meant to adopt that 
position. 
Ultimately, however, it may not matter whether Judge 
Ikuta saw the “long permissible” test as one that must be met in 
addition to Zauderer, or as an alternative path for health and 
safety laws to escape strict scrutiny. If her test offers a second 
pathway for state laws to survive, it is a narrow one that, 
coupled with her strict interpretation of Zauderer, will result in 
few cases passing muster. If she read the “long permissible 
requirement” as an additional element that laws must satisfy 
on top of Zauderer’s “factual and noncontroversial requirement,” 
 
 157. See id. (“Because Zauderer does not apply here, NIFLA directs us to 
consider whether the ordinance survives heightened scrutiny.”).  
 158. Id.  
 159. See Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 
2361, 2376 (2018) (“Contrary to the suggestion in the dissent, we do not 
question the legality of health and safety warnings long considered 
permissible, or purely factual and uncontroversial disclosures about 
commercial products.”). 
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her approach cannot provide the reassurance that the NIFLA 
majority may have meant to offer in responding to Justice 
Breyer.160 Instead, as Judge Ikuta reformulated it, the test is 
rigidly originalist and likely fatal to almost all contemporary 
health or safety laws.   
To see why Judge Ikuta’s approach undermines NIFLA’s 
reassurance, recall that Justice Thomas answered Justice 
Breyer’s concerns in dissent for the future of common health and 
safety laws by saying that the Court’s decision would not 
undermine “health and safety warnings long considered 
permissible.”161 Judge Ikuta quoted Justice Thomas’ language, 
but she also changed it in a critical way by adding the word 
“only” before the quote.162 Thus, Justice Thomas’ comment can 
be, and is most naturally, read as saying that nothing in NIFLA 
threatened health and safety laws, which as a class have long 
been considered constitutional.163 Judge Ikuta, in contrast, 
transformed the test to suggest that “only” those health and 
safety laws that have long been considered permissible remain 
constitutional.164 A statement made to reassure those who 
might fear that NIFLA might dramatically reduce the states’ 
capacity to mandate health and safety warnings instead became 
one suggesting that few warning laws will merit that protection. 
Moreover, in turning to history to determine the 
constitutionality of particular health and safety laws, Judge 
Ikuta did not invoke broad conceptions of tradition, but rather 
a narrow originalism that asks “Was this particular law thought 
to be constitutional in 1791?”165 As Marc O. DeGirolami has 
recently explained, the Supreme Court uses history in different 
ways. In one mode of interpretation, which he coins 
“traditionalist interpretation,” the Court takes “presumptive 
 
 160. The extent of this reassurance is itself unclear. See infra Part III. 
 161. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2376. 
 162. Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco (American 
Beverage II), 916 F.3d 749, 762 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (Ikuta, J., concurring). 
 163. See supra notes 146–147 and accompanying text. 
 164. See American Beverage II, 916 F.3d at 762 (explaining the rationale 
behind the scrutiny applied to public health warnings).  
 165. See id. (noting that there is no tradition of health and safety speech 
regulation dating back to 1791). 
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influence of political and cultural practices of substantial 
duration” to determine the constitutionality of a challenged 
law.166 This approach is often used to decide whether long-held 
practices are constitutional.167 The approach is distinct from 
originalism, which relies on “sources at (or immediately 
preceding and post-dating ratification)” to determine the 
meaning of a constitutional term.168 Thus, the originalist cares 
only about the public understanding of a practice’s 
constitutionality at the time of ratification, when the 
Constitution’s meaning was “fixed.”169 In contrast, the judge 
using traditionalist interpretation considers the practice’s 
acceptance by and role in society in the decades since 
ratification.170 
 
 166. Marc O. DeGirolami, The Traditions of American Constitutional Law, 
95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1123, 1125 (2020) [hereinafter DeGirolami, The 
Traditions] (expanding on traditionalist interpretation); see Marc O. 
DeGirolami, First Amendment Traditionalism, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 1653, 1653 
(2020) (“Traditionalist constitutional interpretation takes political and 
cultural practices of long age and duration as constituting the presumptive 
meaning of the text.”). 
 167. See DeGirolami, The Traditions, supra note 166, at 1124 
(“[T]raditionalist interpretation is pervasive, consistent, and recurrent across 
the Court’s constitutional doctrine.”). 
 168. Id. at 1150. There is a rich body of literature describing different 
modes of originalism, and how the approach has evolved over time. A full 
discussion of this literature is beyond the scope of this paper. However, for 
present purposes we rely on a conception of originalism that Randy Barnett 
has called the “new originalism.” Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for 
Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 620–29 (1999). This approach requires 
the court to look to the popular meaning of a constitutional term at the time 
of ratification, rather than the subjective intent of the framers. See id. at 
620– 21. Judge Ikuta’s opinion seems to adopt new originalism, as she does not 
consider the framer’s intentions, but the legal treatment of warning laws in 
1791. See American Beverage II, 916 F.3d at 762 (“The types of speech exempt 
from First Amendment protection are ‘well-defined and narrowly limited 
classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been 
thought to raise any Constitutional problem,’ from 1791 to present.”).  
 169. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical 
Fact in Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 1 (2015) (“If you want to 
know what the letter means (or more precisely, what it communicates), you 
will need to know what the words and phrases used in the letter meant at the 
time the letter was written.”).  
 170. See supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
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In her concurrence, Judge Ikuta seems to have embraced 
traditionalist interpretation only to transform it into a 
relatively rigid form of originalism.171 In applying the test to San 
Francisco’s ordinance she wrote: 
California has made no showing that the warning here was 
“long considered permissible,” nor could it do so. The types of 
speech exempt from First Amendment protection are 
“well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the 
prevention and punishment of which have been thought to 
raise any Constitutional problem,” from 1791 to present. See 
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–69 
(2010). . . . These limited exceptions include defamation, 
obscenity, and fraud . . . not newly invented classes of 
speech . . . NIFLA did not specify what sorts of health and 
safety warning date back to 1791, but warnings about 
sugar-sweetened beverages are clearly not among them.172 
The passage from Stevens173 that Judge Ikuta cited quotes 
from the Supreme Court’s decision in R.A.V. v. City of St. 
Paul.174 In that case, the Court stated:  
From 1791 to the present, however, our society, like other 
free but civilized societies has permitted restrictions upon 
the content of speech in a few limited areas, which are “of 
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit 
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the 
social interest in order and morality.”175  
As DeGirolami convincingly argues, the Court’s discussions 
of history in R.A.V. and Stevens exemplify traditionalist 
 
 171. Some theorists of originalism distinguish between interpretation, 
which must rely on the fixed understandings of the framing period, and 
construction, which allows for a broader reliance on the “spirit” of the text. See 
Barnett & Bernick, supra note 17, at 5. This approach could theoretically 
converge with traditionalist interpretation. Judge Ikuta’s approach, however, 
is lacking in such nuances, as she would ask simply whether the specific 
disclosure at issue was extant in 1791. 
 172. American Beverage II, 916 F.3d at 762 (Ikuta, J., concurring) (quoting 
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–69 (2010)). 
 173. 559 U.S. 460 (2010). 
 174. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).  
 175. Id. at 382–83 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 
572 (1942)). 
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interpretation.176 The Court in these cases did not state that the 
determination of the constitutionality of a type of speech 
depended solely on whether it was presumed constitutional 
when the Speech Clause was ratified in 1791. Instead, the Court 
spoke about a continuum of understanding “from 1791 to the 
present” that some types of speech are of such low value as to be 
subject to regulation.177 Moreover, the Supreme Court’s opinions 
suggest that the categories are to be determined based on 
longstanding understandings,178 not the understanding at the 
moment of ratification.  
In her rephrasing of Stevens, however, Judge Ikuta 
transformed the Supreme Court’s use of traditionalist 
interpretation into the originalist conclusion that a specific type 
of warning label law can only be constitutional (or only 
constitutional if it isn’t otherwise saved by Zauderer) if it was 
considered constitutional in 1791.179 Coupled with her 
insistence that the determination be based on the history of a 
very specific type of warning label (“about sugar-sweetened 
beverages”) rather than a broader category (health and safety 
warnings, or warnings about dangerous foods), Judge Ikuta has 
erected an extraordinarily high hurdle for warning labels, or 
perhaps any content-based health or safety law. 
 
 176. See DeGirolami, The Traditions, supra note 166, at 1142 (noting that 
the Supreme Court has often relied on traditional exclusory categories in free 
speech cases). 
 177. See id. (noting that the Court does not focus on the meaning at 
enactment, but rather, the meaning from the range of years from 1791 to 
present (quoting R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382–83)). 
 178. See id. As DeGirolami notes, the Court has at times insisted upon a 
“highly specific description of [the tradition].” Id. (citing Stevens, 559 U.S. at 
469). 
 179. See Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco (American 
Beverage II), 916 F.3d 749, 762 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (Ikuta, J., concurring) 
(“The types of speech exempt from First Amendment protection are 
‘well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and 
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional 
problem,’ from 1791 to present.” (quoting Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468–69)). 
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B.  Judge Ikuta’s Originalism 
Like other methods of constitutional interpretation, 
originalism comes in many flavors. Initially, its proponents 
stressed the intentions of the Framers.180 More recently, leading 
originalists have adopted what Randy Barnett has called the 
“new originalism,” which argues that constitutional terms must 
be read by looking to their public meaning at the time of 
ratification, when their meaning was fixed.181 Judge Ikuta’s 
brief invocation of originalism offered no explanation of the 
mode of originalism she intends. However, because she pointed 
to the lack of sugary beverages in 1791 as the determinative 
factor, we will assume that she accepts the broader “new 
originalism” that considers general understandings at the time 
of ratification rather than the specific intentions of the Framers. 
(After all, she doesn’t ask if James Madison indulged in or 
endorsed sugary beverages). 
Whatever the merits of the new originalism as a method of 
constitutional interpretation in general,182 or as applied to the 
Speech Clause in particular,183 Judge Ikuta’s use of it in 
American Beverage II is deeply problematic for a number of 
reasons. Most obviously, she overlooked the critical fact that the 
First Amendment applies to the states, and hence limits the 
 
 180. See Sunstein, supra note 17, at 1673 (describing originalism (citing 
Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. 
L. REV. 204 (1980))); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original 
Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 204 (1980) (“By ‘originalism’ I mean the 
familiar approach to constitutional adjudication that accords binding 
authority to the text of the Constitution or the intentions of its adopters.”).  
 181. Barnett, supra note 168, at 620–29 (outlining the tenets of “new 
originalism”). 
 182. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 183. Originalism has had far less currency with respect to the Speech 
Clause than with other constitutional provisions. This may reflect the 
significant disparity between extant doctrine and contemporary 
understandings of free speech and the historical understanding of the Clause 
that likely viewed the protections of free speech as limited to prior restraints 
or certain other limitations on political speech. See Bunker, supra note 17, at 
330, 350–52 (articulating the disagreements over the application of various 
forms of originalism to the First Amendment); Campbell, supra note 17, at 
249–51 (noting that there are multiple understandings about what the 
Framers meant by the First Amendment’s protection regarding free speech). 
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states’ police power, only through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.184 Thus it is not at all clear why 1791 as opposed 
to 1868 is the critical date for determining the constitutionality 
of state-mandated health warnings.185 After all, to the extent 
that the application of the First Amendment to state health laws 
was fixed at the moment of ratification, it would have been fixed 
in 1868, rather than 1791.186 Thus the question should have 
been whether the Reconstruction Era would have assumed that 
the constitutionality of warning laws depended upon the public 
understanding of the issue in 1868 or whether the 
Reconstruction meaning demanded a reference to 1791.187 Judge 
Ikuta never addresses that issue. 
More interestingly, Judge Ikuta failed to see that the use of 
1791 as the critical date may lead to a very different conclusion 
than the one she drew. Her public health originalism assumes 
that the absence of sugary beverages and warnings about them 
in 1791 means that the original fixed understanding was that 
such warnings violated the Speech Clause.188 In other words, the 
absence of a warning implies that the Speech Clause was 
assumed to apply. But in reaching that conclusion, Judge Ikuta 
overlooked the fact that while the First Amendment did not 
apply to the states in 1791, “health laws of every description” 
were understood to be the provenance of the states.189 Indeed, in 
 
 184. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947) (“The First 
Amendment, as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth, commands 
that a state shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” (internal citations omitted)).   
 185. See supra notes 168–176 and accompanying text.  
 186. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom for the Press as an Industry, or for the 
Press as a Technology? From the Framing to Today, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 459, 
464 (2012) (“Much recent scholarship has suggested that originalist analyses 
of Bill of Rights provisions applied to the states via the Fourteenth 
Amendment should consider the original understanding as of 1868 in addition 
[or as opposed] to that of 1791.”). 
 187. See id. (discussing the application of historical context to 
constitutional rights made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment via a lens of originalism). 
 188. See American Beverage II, 916 F.3d at 762 (“NIFLA did not specify 
what sorts of health and safety warnings date back to 1791, but warnings 
about sugar-sweetened beverages are clearly not among them.”). 
 189. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824)  
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Federalist 17, Alexander Hamilton opined that the federal 
government would have little incentive to intrude upon the 
police power as “[t]he regulation of the mere domestic police of 
a State appears to me to hold out slender allurements to 
ambition.”190 Hence, precisely because the Speech Clause did 
not apply to the states, the framing era would not have assumed 
that it limited health laws.191 Or to put it another way, health 
 
They form a portion of that immense mass of legislation, which 
embraces every thing within the territory of a State, not 
surrendered to the general government: all which can be most 
advantageously exercised by the States themselves . . . health laws 
of every description . . . are component parts of this mass. 
The federal government did enact a few health laws in the early years, but 
these were very limited and did not extend to regulating affairs internal to the 
states. For a discussion of federal health laws in the early decades under the 
Constitution, see Parmet, supra note 20, at 323–25.  
 190. THE FEDERALIST NO. 17, at 93 (Alexander Hamilton) (E. H. Scott ed., 
1868). Emphasizing that the Federalist effort focused on the establishment of 
a federal constitution, Hamilton added: 
The variety of more minute interests, which will necessarily fall 
under the superintendence of local administrations, and which will 
form so many rivulets of influence, running through every part of 
the society, cannot be particularized, without involving a detail too 
tedious and uninteresting to compensate for the instruction it 
might afford. 
Id. at 94 (emphasis added). Importantly Hamilton never suggested that the 
Constitution undermined the states’ ability to engage in local administration. 
 191. It might be said that Judge Ikuta’s assumption that a law cannot be 
constitutional unless it existed and was accepted as such in 1791 simply 
follows from the Supreme Court’s statements in NIFLA, Stevens, and R.A.V., 
that no categories of laws should not be exempted from the First Amendment 
unless there is a long history of treating them as such. See Nat’l Inst. of Fam. 
& Life Advocs. v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2373 (2018); United States 
v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–69 (2010); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 
377, 382–83 (1992). However, as noted above, the Court in these cases used 
traditionalist interpretation, not originalism, and looked to the treatment of 
laws across decades, not solely in 1791. Thus, the Supreme Court’s approach 
allows for a far wider lens and permits consideration of understandings of the 
application of the Speech Clause to state police power laws across time. 
Moreover, the Court in these cases was discussing categories of speech, rather 
than asking whether a specific law (mandated warnings on sugary beverages) 
was accepted as constitutional. Judge Ikuta’s approach would appear to strike 
down almost any law relating to speech that did not exist in 1791, even those 
that fall into broad categories that were accepted as constitutional in 1791. 
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laws (and other police power regulations) would have been 
presumed in 1791 to be beyond the scope of the Clause.192  
Nor does substituting 1868 for 1791 as the critical date for 
determining the meaning of the First Amendment solve all of 
the problems with public health originalism. Recall first that 
the First Amendment was not incorporated into the Fourteenth 
Amendment until the twentieth century193 and there is no 
reason to believe that the Reconstruction Congress, even if it 
accepted incorporation of the First Amendment, thought that 
the Fourteenth Amendment limited state health laws.194 
Rather, the police power jurisprudence during the 
 
For a further discussion of Judge Ikuta’s approach, see supra notes 146–179 
and accompanying text. 
 192. To be sure, state constitutions had speech clauses in the antebellum 
period, and these clauses necessarily applied to state, as opposed to federal, 
law. However, such clauses were most commonly applied in cases concerning 
the regulation of the press, or libel. See, e.g., Respublica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. 319, 
325 (1788) (construing Sec. VII of the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights by 
stating “‘[t]hey give to every citizen a right of investigating the conduct of those 
who are entrusted with the public business; and they effectively preclude any 
attempt to fetter the press by the institution of a licenser”); Commonwealth v. 
Kneeland, 37 Mass. (1 Pick.) 206, 219 (1838) (upholding conviction for 
blasphemy stating that the constitutional provision “was to prevent the 
enactment of license laws, or other direct restraint upon publication, leaving 
individuals at liberty to print, with the previous permission of any office of the 
government”). We have been unable to find any reported cases prior to 
Reconstruction in which a state constitutional provision was used to challenge 
a state health law.  
 193. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“For present 
purposes, we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the 
press— which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgement by 
Congress— are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ 
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from 
impairment by the States.”). 
 194. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 63 (1872) 
(holding that health laws are a “component part” of the “immense mass of 
legislation” left to the states); Parmet, supra note 29, at 481–501 (discussing 
the evolution of public health’s place in police power jurisprudence from 
1868– 1905); THOMAS M. COOLEY, TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE 
AMERICAN UNION 573–76 (1868) (asserting that regulations made under the 
exercise of police power must sometimes change to accord with the general 
well-being of the citizens, but such an exercise cannot come into conflict with 
constitutional provisions). 
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mid-nineteenth century continued to treat the protection of 
public health as firmly within the states’ police power, and not 
limited by the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Moreover, the First Amendment was not thought to 
regulate commercial speech until 1975 when the Supreme Court 
decided Bigelow v. Virginia.195 Thus, if a category of speech is 
exempt from the First Amendment if and only if it was 
presumed to be exempt at the time of the framing of either the 
First or the Fourteenth Amendment, all commercial speech 
regulations should be seen as exempt from the First 
Amendment, as none were not subject to the Speech Clause at 
the time of the framing of either Amendment.196 It is partly for 
this reason that commentators have noted that the Supreme 
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence shows little signs of 
relying on originalism (as opposed to traditionalism).197 A truly 
originalist approach to the First Amendment, even one based on 
new originalism, would be far more (if not totally) tolerant of 
regulations of commercial speech than is current doctrine.198 
 
 195. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). The Court made the 
application of the First Amendment to commercial speech even clearer the 
next year in Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 780 (1976). 
 196. See Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Perils of Parity, 
25 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 965, 971 (2017) (asking whether the equal 
treatment of commercial speech by the First Amendment should be based on 
“older” originalism or “contemporary” originalism). 
 197. See Bunker, supra note 17, at 330 (“For many scholars interested 
specifically in the free speech and press guarantees of the First Amendment, 
there was little doubt that originalism was a defeated interpretive 
philosophy.”). 
 198. Commentators have also argued that the very broad interpretation 
that the Court has accorded to the First Amendment in recent years fails the 
originalism test. Without getting into the question of whether the framing 
generation would have limited the First Amendment to prohibiting prior 
restraints, or limitations on political speech, it is clear that the Court reads 
the Amendment as applying in situations from the regulations of video games 
to campaign finance laws that would not have accorded with original 
understanding of the Speech Clause. See Brown v. Ent. Merch. Ass’n., 564 U.S. 
786, 790 (2011) (noting that video games qualify for protection under the First 
Amendment); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 324 (2010) (“The First 
Amendment does not permit laws that force speakers to retain a campaign 
finance attorney, conduct demographic marketing research, or seek 
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C.  The Original Understanding of Warning Laws 
We have already argued that the suggestion that the 
Speech Clause prohibits health and safety warning laws that 
were not in effect in 1791 ignores the facts that the Clause was 
not read as limiting the police power until the twentieth 
century, and did not apply to commercial speech regulations 
until the 1970s.199 A supporter of this approach might 
nevertheless respond by claiming that there is no evidence that 
the Speech Clause applied to state health laws before the 
mid-twentieth century because there were few such laws, and 
none implicated speech. Thus the framing generation might 
have assumed that the police power did not extend to speech. 
This argument, while plausible on its face, is unconvincing 
for three related reasons. First, it overlooks early 
understandings of the relationship between rights and the 
police power. Second, it erroneously imagines a pre-modern era 
in which health and safety laws were the exceptions, and 
individual liberty (including freedom of speech) was the norm. 
Finally, it ignores the history of mandatory warning and 
labeling laws. Although to the best of our knowledge there were 
no mandated warnings about sugary beverages prior to this 
century, there were mandatory labeling laws in the framing 
period and in the century that followed it, and there is no 
evidence that these were ever thought to clash with the Speech 
Clause. We take each argument in turn. 
Scholars have long debated the intended reach of the 
Speech Clause.200 For present purposes, we put aside these 
debates to focus more broadly on understandings of the 
relationship between rights and the police power from 1791 to 
1868. As Jud Campbell has observed, “Founding Era 
constitutionalism allowed for restrictions of natural liberty to 
promote the public good—generally defined as the good of the 
 
declaratory rulings before discussing the most salient political issues of our 
day.”).  
 199. See supra Parts I, II.A–B.  
 200. For a discussion of the literature, see Campbell, supra note 17, at 
249–50. 
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society as a whole.”201 Campbell explains that during the 
framing period, natural rights “were not legal ‘trumps’ in the 
way that we often talk about rights today.”202 Rather, they were 
understood as “relative and relational”203 to notions of the 
common good. Although members of the framing generation did 
not always agree on every aspect of the relationship between 
natural rights and the social contract, there was general 
agreement that “natural rights were circumscribed by political 
authority to pursue the general welfare.”204 
This view that natural rights, including those relating to 
speech, were correlative with the police power continued 
through the middle of the nineteenth century.205 This helps to 
explain why, as William Novak has noted, “it is extremely 
difficult to find judicial declarations of substantive limits on the 
police power of the state (especially in matters concerning public 
health and safety) before the Civil War.”206 During this period, 
two common law maxims in particular were especially 
important in understanding the relationship between rights, 
the police power, and the common good.207 Sic utere tuo, ut 
alienum non laedas underscored that individual rights were 
constrained by “all manner of wholesome and reasonable 
laws . . . for the good and welfare” of the state. 208 Salus populi 
suprema lex, on the other hand, expressed the priority of laws 
 
 201. Id. at 259. 
 202. Id. at 253.  
 203. NOVAK, supra note 29, at 26. 
 204. Campbell, supra note 17, at 276. 
 205. See NOVAK, supra note 29, at 29–30 (detailing the beliefs evident in 
the natural law canon that humans are social beings). 
 206. Id. at 188. 
 207. See id. at 42 (“The public vision of the common law was best expressed 
in two of its most influential, commonly cited maxims: salus populi suprema 
lex est . . . and sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas . . . .”). 
 208. Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 85 (1851). For a 
further discussion see Barnett & Bernick, supra note 26, at 1664 (articulating 
the police power was occasionally interpreted as an expression of the common 
law maxim relating to nuisance). 
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that promote the public good, “champion[ing] public good over 
private interest.”209  
Although the full contours of the police power were never 
clearly defined, it was always understood to encompass laws 
that sought to protect public health and safety.210 Thus in the 
Supreme Court’s first discussion of the police power in Gibbons 
v. Ogden,211 Chief Justice Marshall explained that the power 
extended to inspection and quarantine laws, as well as “health 
laws of every description.”212 In later cases, the Court continued 
to identify the police power with health regulations to such an 
extent that the determination whether a state law sought to 
protect public health was often critical, if not determinative, of 
whether it was within the police power and hence 
constitutional.213  
Without question, the relationship between the police 
power and individual liberty began to change in the middle of 
the nineteenth century as older notions of a well-regulated 
society gave way to a more individualistic form of liberalism,214 
and courts began to impose substantive limitations on the police 
 
 209. NOVAK, supra note 29, at 46. Novak cautions against the temptation 
to see the salus populi “as demonstrating the existence of a uniform and 
consistent American police-state tradition, a direct nineteenth century 
precursor to the New Deal.” Id. at 236–37. Rather the tradition was distinctive 
“from modern understandings of law, the state, regulation, and private 
rights.” Id. 
 210. See id. at 193 (noting the emphasis of health in explications of the 
police power). According to Novak, “public health was so vital to 
nineteenth-century American governance that it sometimes served as a raison 
d’etre for political organization.” Id. Richard Epstein, in contrast, has argued 
that the “old” public health aligned with market failures, and only limited 
individual rights when doing so was necessary to prevent externalities, 
primarily in the case of communicable diseases and public nuisances. See 
generally Richard A. Epstein, Let the Shoemaker Stick to His Last: A Defense 
of the “Old” Public Health, 46 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. S138 (2003) (explaining 
the traditional and modern forms of public health law).  
 211. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
 212. Id. at 203.  
 213. See Parmet, supra note 24, at 481–501 (discussing the evolution of 
public health’s place in police power jurisprudence from 1868–1905). 
 214. See Barnett & Bernick, supra note 26, at 1666 (explaining that after 
1868, and the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, judges started 
interpreting the police power in terms of the rights of individuals). 
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power.215 Still, throughout the nineteenth century, and even 
through the Lochner period, the Court accepted that the 
protection of public health was a core component of the police 
power.216 Moreover, even as the Court began to see individual 
rights as establishing judicially-enforceable limitations on the 
police power, it accepted that states could impose reasonable 
limits on individual liberty in furtherance of the public’s health, 
without violating the protections for liberty erected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.217 Although post-Slaughter-House,218 
 
 215. The critical pre-Civil War case to describe external, substantive 
limitations on the police power was Wynehemer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856). 
The move to viewing the police power as subject to judicially-enforceable 
substantive limitations is often associated with Thomas Cooley’s 1868 
Constitutional Limitations and Christopher Tiedeman’s 1886 Treatise on the 
Limitations of the Police Power. See generally COOLEY, supra note 194; 
CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER 
IN THE UNITED STATES CONSIDERED FROM BOTH A CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 
STANDPOINT (1886). 
 216. See Parmet, supra note 24, at 493–501 (explaining that public health 
laws were upheld as valid exercises of the police power amidst arguments that 
they deprived individuals of fundamental liberties). It is worth noting that this 
analysis suggests that contrary to the claim that the Supreme Court is 
reverting to Lochner in its First Amendment jurisprudence, see supra note 1 
and accompanying text, the Court is actually doing something quite different 
by overlooking the centrality of public health to the police power jurisprudence 
in the Lochner period. Or, to put it another way, the Court is imposing far 
more onerous limitations on public health powers than did the Lochner court. 
 217. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S 11, 24–25 (1905) 
(articulating that public health laws that are reasonable do not violate the 
Constitution); Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. La. State Bd. 
of Health, 186 U.S. 380, 393 (1902) (explaining that the regulation in the case 
was lawfully adopted under the police power); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 
U.S. 678, 683 (1888) (associating public health with government purposes); 
The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 62 (1872) (connecting the 
police power with public health). Commentators on the police power during 
this period agreed that public health remained a legitimate rationale for 
limiting individual liberty. See COOLEY, supra note 194, at 573 (discussing the 
police power’s extension to “the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, 
and quiet of all persons, and the protection of all property within the State” 
(quoting Thorpe v. Rutland & Burlington R.R., 27 Vt. 140, 149 (1854))); 
Barnett & Bernick, supra note 26, at 1674 (noting that the promotion of public 
health is a valid form of the police power). 
 218. The Court’s ruling in the Slaughter-House Cases effectively curtailed 
the development of a robust police power jurisprudence relating to the 
privileges and immunities clause. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 
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these cases generally focused on the Due Process Clause, there 
is no reason to think that the generation that ratified the 
Fourteenth Amendment would have understood the Speech 
Clause (which doctrinally applies to the police power only 
through the Due Process Clause) as overriding public health 
laws.219 Rather, throughout the nineteenth century and into the 
early twentieth century, the Court and commentators agreed 
that Due Process permitted limiting liberty through reasonable 
health laws.220  
 
Wall.) at 74–79 (explaining the difference between being a citizen of a state 
and a citizen of the United States). 
 219. However, as the doctrine of constitutional limitations developed in 
the late nineteenth century, commentators and courts increasingly saw the 
police power as subject to judicial review. See COOLEY, supra note 194, at 585 
(discussing the judicial review of a regulation giving harbormasters the 
authority to regulate and station ships, which ultimately held that the 
regulation was sustainable as an exercise of police power regulating the 
manner in which individuals could exercise individual rights over property 
involved in commerce (citing Vanderbilt v. Adams, 7 Cow. 349, 351 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1827))). By 1904, Ernst Freund could view the police power as being limited 
by the freedoms of speech and press. See ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: 
PUBLIC POLICY & CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 13 (1904) (noting that the principal 
limitations upon police legislation are laws forbidding the interference with 
free speech). Still, he accepted that numerous mandatory notification laws, 
including a New York law requiring boarding houses to post their rates, 
remained constitutional. See id. at 36–37 (addressing exercises of the police 
power relating to bonds and deposits). For a fuller discussion of how the First 
Amendment was understood in the years between Reconstruction and the 
early twentieth century, see DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN 
YEARS (1997) at 147–49 (detailing the jurisprudence discussing the application 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect individual liberties from state 
encroachment). Although Rabban argues that free speech was understood 
more in the years following Reconstruction to limit the police power in favor 
of individual rights, he does not suggest that it was read even in this later 
period to limit public health laws regulating commercial speech. Id.  
 220. The Supreme Court cases from the period extolling the states’ power 
to protect health are legion. See, e.g., The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 
Wall.) at 62 (connecting the police power with public health); Powell, 127 U.S. 
at 683 (associating public health with government purposes); Campagnie 
Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur, 186 U.S. at 388 (stating that all provisions 
relating to public health are an exercise of the police power); Jacobson, 197 
U.S. at 24– 25 (demonstrating that laws relating to public health and public 
safety are reasonable regulations). Expressing the prevailing view in their 
1892 treatise, Leroy Parker and Robert Worthington wrote that “[i]t needs no 
argument to prove that the highest welfare of the state is subserved by 
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Moreover, from the pre-colonial period through the late 
nineteenth century (and beyond), public health laws, although 
different in many ways from contemporary health laws, were 
plentiful.221 Laws regulating sanitation, demanding the 
abatement of nuisances, imposing quarantines, and regulating 
the sale of potentially unwholesome foods and beverages were 
common in England long before the establishment of the North 
American colonies.222 This regulatory tradition continued in the 
colonial period and lasted through the early years of the 
Constitution.223 To give just a few examples, as early as 1646, 
Massachusetts regulated the quality of bread, and in 1784, it 
barred the sale of unwholesome food.224 In the 1780s, New York 
reenacted its quarantine laws and began to require medical 
licensing.225 In 1704, Charleston, South Carolina regulated 
slaughter-houses and privies.226 
Nor did public health laws disappear in the period leading 
up to and following Reconstruction. Even as a more laissez-faire 
attitude took hold, and support for the “well-regulated society” 
declined, public health regulations were enhanced and 
regularized, especially in urban areas. Throughout the 
nineteenth century, rapidly growing cities were faced with 
waves of devastating epidemics.227 In response, a strong 
 
protecting the life and health of its citizens . . . .” LEROY PARKER & ROBERT H. 
WORTHINGTON, THE LAW OF PUBLIC HEALTH & SAFETY AND THE POWERS AND 
DUTIES OF BOARDS OF HEALTH xxxviii (1892). 
 221. See Parmet, supra note 20, at 282–85 (discussing the many sanitary 
laws dating back to the late Medieval and Renaissance eras and continuing 
through to colonial times). 
 222. See id. at 282–84 (taking a deeper look at medieval English laws 
aimed at protecting public health). 
 223. See id. at 286–302 (providing an overview of public health laws in 
Colonial New England, New York and the Mid-Atlantic Colonies, and the 
South). 
 224. See id. at 290–91. 
 225. See id. at 296; Claudia E. Haupt, Licensing Knowledge, 72 VAND. L. 
REV. 501, 511 (2019) (discussing the emergence of medical and other 
professional licensing and the police power). 
 226. See Parmet, supra note 20, at 301. 
 227. See INST. OF MED., COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC 
HEALTH, THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 58 (1988) (explaining that disease 
spread rampantly in the nineteenth century due to urbanization).  
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sanitary movement developed, which led jurisdictions to 
establish standing, professionalized boards of health, and 
promulgate robust and far-reaching sanitary codes.228 As Novak 
shows, by 1872, New York’s sanitary code covered an 
extraordinarily wide array of activities from alcohol to 
firecrackers, and poison to theaters.229 During the middle and 
late nineteenth century, jurisdictions also mandated 
vaccination,230 imposed quarantines,231 and regulated 
professions in the name of public health.232 Thus, from colonial 
times through and beyond the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, public health laws regulating the sale of food 
would not have been seen as an absurdity, as Judge Ikuta’s 
comments imply. Rather, they would have been recognized as a 
well-established and mundane exercise of the police power.233 
To be sure, most public health laws, even those that 
regulated food and beverages, did not implicate speech. 
Mandatory warnings were far less ubiquitous in the nineteenth 
century than they became in the twentieth century.234 Still, the 
regulation of product labels, including via warnings, was not 
unknown in either 1791 or 1868. For example, in their history 
of government regulation of branding and labeling of foods, 
 
 228. See id. at 58–62 (noting the nineteenth century’s recognition of public 
health issues, resulting in the adoption of sanitary laws, public health surveys, 
waste disposal, etc.).  
 229. NOVAK, supra note 29, at 198–200 (providing a list of persons, places, 
and things covered by New York’s sanitary laws). 
 230. See LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN & LINDSAY F. WILEY, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: 
POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 348–49 (3d ed. 2016) (elaborating on the 
development of mandatory vaccination laws beginning with the smallpox 
vaccine). 
 231. See, e.g., Jennifer Jolly-Ryan, Balancing Interests and Risk of Error: 
What Quarantine Process Is Due After Ebola, 96 NEB. L. REV. 100, 110–14 
(2017) (discussing the history of quarantine). 
 232. See Haupt, supra note 225, at 511–14 (discussing the traditional 
justifications for professional licensing).  
 233. This is not to say that the sugary beverages would have been viewed 
as unhealthy in the nineteenth century; rather that regulations of items that 
were thought unhealthy to consume were neither uncommon nor assumed to 
conflict with individual rights. 
 234. For a discussion of why such laws proliferated in the twentieth 
century, see infra notes 268–284 and accompanying text.  
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Peter Barton Hutt and Peter Barton Hutt II cite the Assize of 
Bread and Ale law of 1266 as the first example in 
Anglo-American law of an affirmative branding law.235 Notably 
this law did not simply prohibit false labeling, it also required 
sellers to include specific information regarding the weight of a 
loaf, and the name of the owner.236 Likewise, in 1480, Scotland 
required the labeling of poisons.237 Similar requirements that 
sellers provide information relating to food appear in numerous 
other statutes across English legal history.238 Such laws made 
their way to the English colonies. In 1646, for example, the 
Massachusetts Bay Colony mandated that “every Baker shall 
have a distinct mark for his Bread.”239 
Laws mandating markings or warnings continued 
throughout the nineteenth century. In 1829, for example, New 
York enacted the first American law requiring that arsenic or 
prussic acid be labeled as a poison.240 Other states, including 
Ohio, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania enacted similar laws prior 
to Reconstruction.241  
 
 235. See Peter Barton Hutt & Peter Barton Hutt II, A History of 
Government Regulation of Adulteration and Misbranding of Food, 39 FOOD 
DRUG COSM. L.J. 2, 14 (1984) (“This statute specifically required what may 
well be the first example of affirmative food labeling in history . . . .”).  
 236. See id. (discussing the historical context of warning labels).  
 237. EDWARD KREMERS & GEORGE URDANG, HISTORY OF PHARMACY: A 
GUIDE AND A SURVEY 389 n.1480 (1940) (stating that the first poison law in 
Scotland was issued by James I). 
 238. See Hutt & Hutt II, supra note 235, at 14–17 (discussing laws 
regarding requirements for providing food information that came after the 
Assize of Bread and Ale law of 1266). 
 239. Id. at 36 (quoting THE LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS 3 
(1648)).  
 240. Marian Moser Jones & Isidore Daniel Benrubi, Poison Politics: A 
Contentious History of Consumer Protection Against Dangerous Household 
Chemicals in the United States, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 801, 802 (2013), 
https://perma.cc/5RMR-J4B8 (PDF). 
 241. See id. at 810 n.9 (“Ohio (1852), Pennsylvania (1860), and Wisconsin 
(1862) also enacted laws that required sellers of poisons to include both a label 
on poisons and a record of the poison’s sale.”). It is worth noting that despite 
his support for freedom of expression, John Stuart Mill approved of laws 
requiring markings on poisons and dangerous drugs. See JOHN STUART MILL, 
ON LIBERTY (1859), https://perma.cc/87PU-T26P (PDF) (“Such a precaution, 
for example, as that of labelling the drug with some word expressive of its 
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Poison warnings were not the only mandatory warning laws 
extant during the middle and late nineteenth century.242 
Warnings about ingredients in food were common. Reviewing 
the landscape in 1904, shortly before the first federal drug 
labeling act was enacted,243 Ernst Freund remarked that, “A 
very common form of notice consists in marks, signs, labels, or 
stamps, which are required to be affixed to articles of commerce 
in order to advise the public of their true nature.”244 Although 
these laws were sometimes challenged under the emerging 
substantive due process doctrine that reviewed state police 
power regulations for their reasonableness, and their 
 
dangerous character, may be enforced without violation of liberty: the buyer 
cannot wish not to know that the thing he possesses has poisonous qualities.”); 
NOVAK, supra note 29, at 181 (“As Mill and Cooley recognized, prohibition 
obliterated established property and economic rights in the liquor trade. But 
according to these state jurists, such destruction was simply an extension of 
the principles and practices of well-regulated governance serving public 
morality.”). 
 242. In his rejection of the “new public health,” Epstein argues that in the 
earlier period, public health was rightly confined to limiting infectious 
diseases and nuisances. See Epstein, supra note 210, at S139. These laws 
cannot be fit into those categories. Nor can they easily be explained as 
preventing deception, as many required the affirmative listing of ingredients 
or warnings. Thus, these laws were early consumer-protection, public health 
laws quite analogous to the type of warning laws at issue in NIFLA and 
American Beverage. See supra Part I. In all cases, the laws attempted to 
provide individuals with information about the dangers of a product or service 
that they might not have otherwise known about. See supra notes 239–241 
and accompanying text. Thus, these laws sought to protect otherwise 
competent individuals from dangers to their own health. 
 243. Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768. 
 244. FREUND, supra note 219, at 38. In his discussion of labeling laws, 
Freund cites to one case from a lower court in Texas striking down the state’s 
labeling laws. See id. (citing Dorsey v. State, 44 S.W. 514 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1898)). As Freund notes, the court there found the state law to be unduly 
oppressive, but suggested that the law would be upheld if it provided greater 
specificity. Id. Moreover, the court in that case did not view the law as 
implicating speech, but rather as a substantive regulation on industry, which 
applying the more limited police power jurisprudence of the era, the court saw 
as unreasonable and oppressive. See Dorsey v. State, 44 S.W. 514, 532–33 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1898) (finding that the law was impermissible because it was 
too general in its terms in that “[i]t simply embraces all articles of food or 
drink, without naming any, and makes the mixture of any articles of food, 
however nutritious, without labeling the product, an offense”). 
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relationship to public health, the challenges were not based on, 
nor were the cases decided on, the statues’ impact on speech.245 
Indeed, in his influential 1868 treatise that sought to establish 
limits on the police power, and expand judicial protections for 
individual liberty, Judge Cooley never discussed labeling laws 
in conjunction with his examination of either freedom of the 
press or speech.246  
In short, warning laws, especially with respect to food and 
beverages, existed in 1791 and even more so in 1868. Moreover, 
at no time prior to the ratification of either the Speech Clause 
or the Fourteenth Amendment did American jurists treat such 
laws as unconstitutionally infringing upon free speech.247 
Rather such laws were understood in relationship to the police 
power jurisprudence of the era. And although that 
jurisprudence changed significantly between 1791 and 1900, 
prior to the twentieth century, it never extended so far as to 
envision that freedom of speech overrode product labeling 
laws.248 Rather than being the original understanding, the view 
expressed in Judge Ikuta’s concurrence, as well as in the 
American Beverage II majority opinion and NIFLA, came far 
later.  
D.  Public Health Law after Public Health Originalism 
Although health and safety warning laws have long existed, 
they are undoubtedly far more common today than they were 
even fifty years ago.249 One reason for this may be the Supreme 
 
 245. See, e.g., Stolz v. Thompson, 46 N.W. 410, 411 (Minn. 1890) (affirming 
a law requiring disclosure of aluminum in baking soda); People v. Arensberg, 
11 N.E. 277, 281 (N.Y. 1887) (affirming the conviction of a defendant who 
violated a butter purity statute by failing to disclose the use of an alternate 
milk). 
 246. See COOLEY, supra note 194, at 414–66. 
 247. See supra notes 210–213 and accompanying text. 
 248. See supra notes 213–216 and accompanying text. 
 249. See Stephanie (Malchine) Neitzel, One Size Fits All: A Federal 
Approach to Accurate Labeling of Consumer Products, 23 J. HEALTH CARE L. & 
POL’Y 87, 88–103 (2020) (“[S]tates are becoming increasingly active in taking 
initiative to regulate potentially hazardous substances within their 
marketplaces . . . .”). 
 
280 78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231 (2021) 
 
Court’s own jurisprudence. Another may be the influence of the 
libertarian critique of public health, which has led policymakers 
to seek alternatives to more paternalistic, command and control 
regulations. 
As noted above, the Supreme Court first distinguished laws 
barring commercial speech from disclosure laws in Zauderer.250 
In affirming a provision of an Ohio law that permitted 
disciplining attorneys for using graphic illustrations in 
advertisements, the Court explained that “disclosure 
requirements trench much more narrowly on an advertiser’s 
interests than do flat prohibitions on speech,”251 and that an 
advertiser’s interest in “not providing any particular factual 
information in his advertising is minimal.”252 In short, as the 
Court saw it, laws that required the disclosure of factual 
information did not raise the same constitutional alarms as laws 
that banned commercial speech. 
The disparate constitutional status of laws banning and 
laws requiring speech took on new importance in subsequent 
years as the Supreme Court looked less favorably on laws that 
prohibited commercial speech, even when they sought to protect 
health or safety. For example, in 2001 in Lorillard Tobacco Co. 
v. Reilly,253 the Court applied a relatively stringent version of 
the Central Hudson test to strike down a Massachusetts 
regulation banning certain outdoor and point-of-sale 
advertisements of tobacco products.254 The next year, in 
Thompson v. Western States Medical Center,255 the Court struck 
down a provision of the Food and Drug Administration 
Modernization Act of 1997 that banned advertisements for 
compounded pharmaceuticals.256 Then in Sorrell v. IMS Health 
 
 250. See supra notes 47–50 and accompanying text. 
 251. Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns., 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
 252. Id. 
 253. 533 U.S. 525 (2001). 
 254. Id. at 554–56. 
 255. 535 U.S. 357 (2002).  
 256. Id. at 357. Interestingly, the Court in Thompson rejected the 
government’s argument that advertisements for compounding pharmacies 
could endanger the public’s health. Id. at 373–75. Sadly, the Court’s prediction 
proved false, as became evident when 64 people were killed, and 751 were 
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Inc.,257 the Court found that a Vermont law banning the sale of 
physician prescription information violated the First 
Amendment.258 Without deciding whether the law in that case 
constituted commercial speech, the Court stated that all laws 
that discriminate on the basis of speech or the speaker require 
“heightened scrutiny.”259 Relying on Sorrell, the Second Circuit 
in United States v. Caronia260 held that the FDA’s ban on 
promoting off-label uses for prescription drugs was 
unconstitutional.261 
Such cases have led numerous commentators to warn that 
the FDA’s regulatory oversight of drug advertising is 
imperiled.262 Critically, however, the peril did not appear, at 
least initially, to touch mandatory disclosure and warning laws 
precisely due to Zauderer.263 Although lower court cases such as 
 
injured in a meningitis outbreak associated with the New England 
Compounding Center. See Nathaniel A.W. Crider, What You Don’t Know Will 
Kill You: A First Amendment Challenge to Lethal Injection Secrecy, 48 COLUM. 
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 17 (2014); Kevin Outterson, Perspective: Regulating 
Compounding Pharmacies After NECC, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1969, 1969 
(2012). 
 257. 564 U.S. 552 (2011). 
 258. Id. at 557. 
 259. Id. at 566. This insistence that all content-based regulations of speech 
are presumptively unconstitutional was reiterated by the Court in Reed v. 
Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 2226 (2015) (“Content-based laws—those that 
target speech based on its communicative content—are presumptively 
unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that they 
are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.”).  
 260. 703 F.3d. 149 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 261. Id. at 169.  
 262. See generally Kapczynski, supra note 15; Aaron S. Kesselheim & 
Michelle M. Mello, Prospects for Regulation of Off-Label Drug Promotion in an 
Era of Expanding Commercial Speech Protection, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1539 (2014). 
See Christopher Robertson, When Truth Cannot Be Presumed: The Regulation 
of Drug Promotion Under an Expanding First Amendment, 94 B.U. L. REV. 
545, 552–55 (2014). 
 263. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Compelling Product Sellers to Transmit 
Government Public Health Messages, 29 J.L. & POL. 557, 561 (2014) 
(explaining that because of the Supreme Court’s holding in Zauderer, laws 
that require firms to disclose or warn about “facts that are incontestable” are 
allowable).  
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Brown & Williamson264 and AMI portended that the Supreme 
Court’s newfound protection for commercial speech might 
extend to mandated warnings and disclosures, at least until 
NIFLA, Zauderer remained unchallenged by the high Court.265 
As a result, advocates and policymakers who were concerned 
about the health harms associated with dangerous products or 
activities were well-advised to seek laws that mandated 
disclosures rather than laws that restricted speech.266 Given the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, it was reasonable pre-NIFLA to 
assume that the latter were far more likely to survive a First 
Amendment challenge than were laws banning advertising.267 
Constitutional jurisprudence was not, however, the sole 
reason why advocates and policymakers came to rely upon 
mandated disclosure and warning laws. In addition to being 
constitutionally safer, many commentators argued that 
mandatory warning and disclosure laws were less paternalistic 
and more respectful of individual liberty than command and 
control laws that restricted the sale or use of dangerous 
products.268 After all, disclosures and warnings do not limit 
consumer choice. Instead, they seek to provide consumers with 
 
 264. 710 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1983).  
 265. See infra Part III.B.; see also Aaron Stenz, Note, The Controversial 
Demise of Zauderer: Revitalizing Zauderer Post-NIFLA, 104 MINN. L. REV. 
553, 568–71 (2019) (discussing Zauderer pre-NIFLA and stating that lower 
courts applied Zauderer inconsistently). 
 266. See Sugarman, supra note 263, at 567–75 (arguing that compelled 
health and safety laws do not offend the First Amendment).   
 267. See id.   
 268. See Bloche, supra note 31, at 1359 (“Public education efforts, 
mandatory disclosure of ingredients and risks, and the prospect of liability for 
gratuitously hazardous food products can make a difference in this regard 
without overriding people’s eating preferences.”); Lewis Grossman, FDA and 
the Role of the Empowered Consumer, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 627, 642 (discussing 
the FDA’s increasing reliance on mandated disclosures as a move from a 
paternalistic approach to regulation to one that empowers consumers). For a 
fuller discussion as to whether laws that limit the rights of industries to 
protect the health of consumers can be considered paternalistic, see Wendy 
Mariner, Paternalism, Public Health, and Behavioral Economics: A 
Problematic Combination, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1817, 1825–29 (2014); Wendy E. 
Parmet, Paternalism, Self-Governance, and Public Health: The Case of 
E-Cigarettes, 70 MIA. L. REV. 879, 892–95 (2016).  
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information about a product’s risk.269 Hence mandatory 
disclosure and warning laws can be viewed as a form of “soft 
paternalism,” or “weak-form debiasing” that simply help to 
correct for market inefficiencies and the limits of human 
rationality.270 In an era, such as our own, in which paternalistic 
regulations are widely scorned,271 especially for risks that do not 
appear to present harm to others, mandated speech laws easily 
became the preferable regulatory option. 
In some circumstances, mandated warnings and disclosures 
are also the more politically viable option.272 Precisely because 
speech mandates are seen as less restrictive on consumer choice 
than laws limiting the sale or use of products, they often 
encounter less (or less successful) pushback.273 At the same 
time, because such laws often impose far fewer costs on industry 
than other forms of product regulation,274 industry opposition 
 
 269. See Neitzel, supra note 249, at 87 (“Accurate labeling of food and other 
consumer commodities empowers citizens to make informed decisions 
concerning the products they choose to bring into their lives.”). 
 270. David Adam Friedman, Public Health Regulation and the Limits of 
Paternalism, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1687, 1729 (2014). The literature on “soft 
paternalism” is extensive. See generally, e.g., Thaddeus Mason Pope, Counting 
the Dragon’s Teeth and Claws: The Definition of Hard Paternalism, 20 GA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 659 (2004); Sunstein, supra note 17; Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. 
Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 175 (2003), https://
perma.cc/8AY2-8NB8 (PDF).  
 271. Many commentators argued that public health laws relating to 
non-communicable diseases are inappropriately paternalistic. See, e.g., 
Epstein, supra note 210; Mark A. Hall, The Scope and Limits of Public Health 
Law, 46 PERSPS. BIOLOGY & MED. S199, S199 (2003), https://perma.cc/9G5Z-
9PCY (PDF); Friedman, supra note 270, at 1767–69 (arguing that 
paternalistic interventions aimed at non-communicable diseases are often not 
politically viable).  
 272. See Friedman, supra note 270, at 1733 (“The political feasibility of 
disclosure may indeed tempt policymakers.”). 
 273. See id. (“With the exception of Mississippi, the positive reaction to the 
soft paternalism of mandatory calorie disclosure has not been overwhelmed by 
any noticeable popular backlash . . . .”). 
 274. See Robin Hanson, Warning Labels as Cheap-Talk: Why Regulators 
Ban Drugs, 87 J. PUB. ECON. 2013, 2015 (2003), https://perma.cc/ZX9F-FV8R 
(PDF) (explaining, from an economic game-theory standpoint, why speech 
regulation is more cost effective than other forms of government oversight). 
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may be less fierce.275 In some instances, industry may even be 
willing to accept warning laws in lieu of more stringent 
regulations. For example, the first federal law requiring 
warning labels on cigarettes was passed with the support of the 
tobacco companies in part because the regulations precluded 
more stringent FTC regulations of cigarette advertising.276  
That Cigarette Labeling Law also contained another 
provision that frequently accompanies warning labels: 
preemption.277 To give just a few examples, FDA labeling 
requirements preempt tort claims relating to medical devices,278 
 
 275. For example, in 2012, New York City promulgated an ordinance that 
regulated portion sizes. The ordinance might have been less offensive from a 
constitutional perspective than the San Francisco ordinance, because it did 
not touch upon speech or any other constitutionally-protected right. See 
Lindsay F. Wiley, Sugary Drinks, Happy Meals, Social Norms, and the Law: 
The Normative Impact of Product Configuration Bans, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1877, 
1880–81 (2014). Nevertheless, the ban engendered intense opposition from 
industry. See, e.g., Adam Gabbatt, New York City Soda Ban Struck Down by 
Judge in Eleventh-Hour Ruling, GUARDIAN (Mar. 11, 2013, 4:24 AM), https://
perma.cc/Z5VK-49M3. Ultimately the law was struck down on state 
administrative law grounds. See N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hisp. Chambers of 
Comm. v. N.Y. City Dept. of Health & Mental Hygiene, 16 N.E.3d 538, 541 
(N.Y. 2014) (“We hold that the New York City Board of Health, in adopting the 
‘Sugary Drinks Portion Cap Rule,’ exceeded the scope of its regulatory 
authority.”). Industry continues to oppose a wide range of measures that aim 
to protect Americans from unhealthy foods. See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin, “Big 
Food” Is Making America Sick, 94 MILBANK Q. 480 (2016), https://perma.cc
/ZZ62-E8W6 (PDF). In 2019, industry-led opposition helped to defeat a 
measure similar to New York’s portion law in the California legislature. See 
Patrick McGreevy, California’s Proposed Ban on “Big Gulp”-Style Sodas is 
Shelved, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2019, 9:39 AM), https://perma.cc/DW2Q-Z94V.  
 276. See ALLAN M. BRANDT, THE CIGARETTE CENTURY: THE RISE, FALL, AND 
DEADLY PERSISTENCE OF THE PRODUCT THAT DEFINED AMERICA 251–61 (2007) 
(explaining that The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 
prohibited “FTC requirements for health warnings in ads for four years”). 
 277. See id.  
 278. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 312 (2008) (“The MDA’s 
pre-emption clause bars common-law claims challenging the safety or 
effectiveness of a medical device marketed in a form that received premarket 
approval from the FDA.”). 
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generic drugs,279 and dietary supplements.280 The federal 
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act281 also preempts state 
labeling laws that are not “identical” to federal requirements.282 
Even the calorie disclosure requirements in the Affordable Care 
Act283 preempt state and local laws that require food 
establishments to post the calories of their fare.284 Thus by 
preventing inconsistent or stronger state regulations and 
litigation, mandated warning laws may benefit industry as 
much as public health. 
What then might be the public health impact if courts adopt 
public health originalism and strike down all warning and 
disclosure laws that were not in effect in 1791?285 A full analysis 
of that question is beyond the scope of this discussion, but a few 
comments are worth noting. 
 
 279. See Mut. Pharms. Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472, 472 (2013) (“State-law 
design-defect claims that turn on the adequacy of a drug’s warnings are 
pre-empted by federal law . . . .”); PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 624 
(2011) (“Here, state law imposed a duty on the Manufacturers to take a certain 
action, and federal law barred them from taking that action. The only action 
the Manufacturers could independently take . . . is not a matter of state-law 
concern.”). 
 280. Dachauer v. NBTY, Inc., 913 F.3d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding 
that federal law “preempts state-law requirements for claims about dietary 
supplements that differ from the FDCA’s requirements”).   
 281. 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a)(5). 
 282. Id. 
 283. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119 (2010). 
 284. See Jason P. Block, The Calorie-Labeling Saga—Federal Preemption 
and Delayed Implementation of the Public Health Law, 2018 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1, 1 (stating that the ACA preempts state and local food regulatory 
requirements). 
 285. The discussion that follows focuses solely on the impact of Judge 
Ikuta’s approach on disclosures and warnings that are required by statute or 
regulation, as opposed to common law duties to warn or informed consent. 
Were a court to conclude that these common law regulations of speech were 
unconstitutional because they were not in effect in 1791, the impact might be 
quite different and potentially greater than that discussed below. NIFLA 
emphasizes that informed consent and tort liability for professional 
malpractice have a long history. Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra 
(NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2373 (2018). 
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First, a very wide array of federal, state, and local laws 
might be affected. In addition to the FDA regulations requiring 
warnings on direct-to-consumer advertisements,286 the adoption 
of public health originalism may threaten laws requiring that 
alcoholic beverages warn about the risks of drinking during 
pregnancy,287 and that smokeless tobacco products carry 
warnings about the risks associated with their use.288 The 
federal law mandating warnings on vaccines might also be 
imperiled.289 At the state level, California’s Prop. 65,290 which 
requires businesses to give “reasonable warnings” about 
products which may expose people to carcinogens would be 
likely to fail291 as might a New York City requirement providing 
warnings about health risks of high sodium food.292 So, too, 
might laws requiring hospitals to warn parents about child seat 
belts or the availability of pediatric vaccines.293  
Whether public health would suffer if these or many other 
laws fall is unclear. The empirical literature on the efficacy of 
disclosure laws is vast and suggests wide variation depending 
on the specific nature (size, visibility, and content) of the 
required warning.294 While there is no question that the public 
 
 286. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(n). 
 287. See 27 U.S.C. § 215. 
 288. See 15 U.S.C. § 4402.  
 289. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-26. For a further discussion of warnings and 
vaccines, see infra notes 350–353 and accompanying text. 
 290. Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.5–.14 (West 2020). 
 291. Id. Even without Judge Ikuta’s approach, this law has been found 
unconstitutional as applied. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Wheat Growers v. Zeise, 
309 F. Supp. 3d 842, 853 (E.D. Cal. 2018). 
 292. N.Y. Health Code § 81.49 (McKinney 2020). 
 293. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2380–81 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (claiming 
that numerous common medical disclosure requirements are threatened by 
the majority’s decision). 
 294. Hanson, supra note 274, at 2014 (reviewing the literature and 
concluding that the impact of warnings “range from mild to non-existent”); 
Robinson et al., supra note 31, at 21–22 (arguing for the use of a cost-benefit 
approach to warnings that takes into account the risk of a product and noting 
that poorly tailored warnings may lead consumers to avoid less risky products 
and turn instead to more dangerous ones); David W. Stewart and Ingrid M. 
Martin, Intended and Unintended Consequences of Warning Messages: A 
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can suffer from warning overload,295 studies suggest that 
tobacco warnings, especially graphic warnings (that appear to 
be the most constitutionally vulnerable), can reduce tobacco 
use.296 Likewise, research suggests that well-designed warning 
labels about sugar-sweetened beverages can correct 
misperceptions about sugary beverages and lower 
consumption.297 But the actual impact of a constitutional 
doctrine that effectively forecloses the government’s ability to 
require health or safety warnings would likely depend on 
whether other regulatory tools replaced compelled speech. One 
possibility, certainly unintended by many of those who 
challenge warning laws, is that preemption would fall alongside 
warning laws, leaving industry more vulnerable to state tort 
 
Review and Synthesis of Empirical Research, 13 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 1 
(1994), https://perma.cc/VY3B-RWXQ (PDF) (reviewing literature and 
concluding that impact of warning messages depends upon their specific 
design); Monica Trommelen, Effectiveness of Explicit Warnings, 25 SAFETY SCI. 
79, 79 (1997), https://perma.cc/B9B4-AQUU (PDF) (conducting a study on 
explicit warnings and finding that “[t]he results indicate that with explicit 
warnings, subjects perceived the products investigated as more hazardous and 
the possible injuries more severe”). 
 295. See Robinson et al., supra note 31, at 14–21 (arguing that excessive 
use of warnings may lead consumers to ignore them). 
 296. See, e.g., Chris Skurka et al., Independent or Synergistic? Effects of 
Varying Size and Using Pictorial Images in Tobacco Health Warnings, 198 
DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 87, 90 (2019), https://perma.cc/4YYS-PWC5 
(PDF); Hsiao-Yn Lee et al., The Effect of E-Cigarette Warning Labels on 
College Students’ Perception of E-Cigarettes and Intention to Use E-Cigarettes, 
76 ADDICTIVE BEHAVS. 106, 109 (2018), https://perma.cc/29XQ-27HC (PDF); 
Seth M. Noar et al., The Impact of Strengthening Cigarette Pack Warnings: 
Systematic Review of Longitudinal Observational Studies, 164 SOC. SCI. & 
MED. 118, 125 (2016), https://perma.cc/752A-974T (PDF). But see Pieter Van 
Dessel et al., Graphic Cigarette Pack Warnings Do Not Produce More Negative 
Implicit Evaluations of Smoking Compared to Text-Only Warnings, PLOS ONE 
(March 15, 2018), https://perma.cc/YZD7-2ALG (finding that graphic warnings 
were associated with a more positive evaluation of smoking than text-only 
warnings). 
 297. See Grant E. Donnelly et al., The Effect of Graphic Warnings on 
Sugary-Drink Purchasing, 29 PSYCH. SCI. 1321, 1329 (2018), https://perma.cc
/65V3-R5B3 (PDF); Eleni Mantzari et al., Impact of Warning Labels on 
Sugar-Sweetened Beverages on Parental Selection: An Online Experimental 
Study, 12 PREVENTIVE MED. REPS. 259 (2018), https://perma.cc/4DJ4-XPCF 
(PDF); Alyssa J. Moran & Christina A. Roberto, Health Warning Labels 
Correct Parents’ Misperceptions About Sugary Drink Options, 55 AM. J. 
PREVENTIVE MED. e19 (2018), https://perma.cc/F8Z8-P74U (PDF). 
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claims. Whether that would create greater health benefits than 
warning laws is certainly questionable, but at least plausible in 
some cases. 
In addition, without the ability to rely on warning labels, 
public health advocates and regulators might push harder for 
more restrictive command and control regulations. Without 
question, they would fail in many cases, leading to less 
regulation in some areas, potentially jeopardizing public health. 
But it is certainly possible that in some cases, regulators would 
succeed in banning or restricting the use of products, or 
imposing more onerous excise taxes. In some cases, this might 
actually lead to greater health gains than can be achieved by 
warning laws (although at the price of less consumer choice). In 
other cases, public health might actually suffer if access to 
products that can benefit the health of some patients is 
restricted because regulators lack the capacity to warn other 
consumers who may be harmed about the product.   
In either case, the result may well be paradoxical. Rather 
than ensuring a world of limited regulation, Judge Ikuta’s form 
of public health originalism might presage an increased reliance 
on the type of command and control market regulations that 
were a well-accepted feature of the police power in the 
pre-liberal era. 
III. THE FUTURE OF COMPELLED DISCLOSURES IN PUBLIC 
HEALTH REGULATION 
So where are we today? Does NIFLA command either Judge 
Ikuta’s public health originalism or a different approach to 
compelled health and safety disclosures? As we have already 
argued, Judge Ikuta’s approach would threaten a wide range of 
health and safety laws.298 But even if courts do not adopt her 
notion of public health originalism, commentators have worried 
that NIFLA itself might threaten environmental disclosures,299 
 
 298. See supra notes 285–293 and accompanying text. 
 299. See, e.g., Lauren L. Sherman, Note, A Warning for Environmental 
Warnings: Regulatory Uncertainty in the Face of First Amendment Regulation, 
27 N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 240, 296 (2019) (asserting that NIFLA makes it difficult 
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as well as laws requiring “disclosures in the realms of medicine, 
law, business, education, child welfare, banking, alcohol and 
drugs, and even barbering and cosmetology.”300 In addition, as 
discussed above, federal regulation by the FDA may also be in 
peril.301 In the FDA context, for example, a new round of First 
Amendment objections to the latest iteration of graphic tobacco 
warnings released in August 2019 is likely.302 Drug companies 
have also raised First Amendment objections to recent 
Department of Health and Human Services regulations 
requiring the disclosure of drug prices.303 
In his NIFLA dissent, Justice Breyer emphatically warned 
of the dangers of calling wide swaths of ordinary public health 
and safety warnings into question.304 These concerns are likely 
 
for governments making disclosure requirements to “connect an action or 
product with the risk or policy issue that they are trying to address”).  
 300. Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Constitutional 
Gerrymandering Against Abortion Rights: NIFLA v. Becerra, 94 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 61, 111 (2019); see id. at 111–18 (presenting a range of disclosures 
implicated by NIFLA). 
 301. See, e.g., Kapczynski, supra note 15, at 180 (“There may be no edifice 
of public regulatory power more immediately threatened by this trend [of 
commercial speech protections expansion] than the Food and Drug 
Administration.”); Lim, supra note 2, at 141–48 (discussing recent commercial 
warnings and disclosures that may be threatened by NIFLA); Carl Wiersum, 
No Longer Business as Usual: FDA Exceptionalism, Commercial Speech, and 
the First Amendment, 73 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 486, 486 (2018) (“[I]n the last two 
decades, FDA has lost case after case with respect to challenges under the 
First Amendment.”); see also supra notes 286–297 and accompanying text. 
 302. See Cigarette Health Warnings, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://
perma.cc/A2T4-V3JR (last updated Jan. 30, 2020) (showing the thirteen 
different proposed cigarette health warnings to promote greater public 
understanding of the negative health consequences of smoking); see also 
Sheila Kaplan, The F.D.A.’s New Cigarette Warnings Are Disturbing. See for 
Yourself., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2019), https://perma.cc/G974-TLC8 (quoting a 
spokesperson for R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, who stated that the company “firmly 
support[s] public awareness of the harms of smoking cigarettes, but the 
manner in which those messages are delivered to the public . . . cannot run 
afoul of the First Amendment protections that apply”). 
 303. See, e.g., Merck & Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 962 F.3d 
531, 533 (D.D.C. 2019) (ruling that the court need not reach plaintiff’s First 
Amendment claims against drug-pricing disclosure regulation because the 
regulation violates Administrative Procedures Act).  
 304. See Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 
2361, 2381 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Historically, the Court has been wary of 
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heightened in light of the current pandemic305 and potential 
issues relating to the authorization and dissemination of a 
vaccine.306  
Starting with the observation that all disclosure laws are 
inherently content based because they require articulating a 
specific message, he cautioned that “the majority’s view, if taken 
literally, could radically change prior law, perhaps placing much 
securities law or consumer protection law at constitutional risk, 
depending on how broadly its exceptions are interpreted.”307 In 
this respect, NIFLA is similar to Reed v. Town of Gilbert,308 
which, taken to apply across all areas of the First Amendment, 
would dramatically alter the doctrinal role of content 
neutrality.309 Likewise, if taken literally, even without Judge 
Ikuta’s gloss, NIFLA would dramatically expand commercial 
speech protection to the detriment of consumer and public 
health protection.310 But application of the type of aggressive 
content-neutrality prescribed in Reed is incompatible with the 
normative underpinnings of large areas of speech as well as 
many seemingly settled areas of First Amendment 
 
claims that regulation of business activity, particularly health-related 
activity, violates the Constitution.”). 
 305. See Lauren M. Sauer, What is Coronavirus?, JOHNS HOPKINS MED., 
https://perma.cc/8L4G-FDL5 (last updated Oct. 16, 2020) (discussing the 
ongoing coronavirus pandemic). 
 306. See Maggie Fox, Federal Government Wants to Deliver Vaccine Shots 
Within a Day or Two of FDA Approval, Officials Say, CNN (Oct. 16, 2020 8:37 
PM), https://perma.cc/5YUE-6AD6 (reporting that the federal government 
hopes to start vaccinating people against coronavirus very soon after FDA 
emergency authorization). 
 307. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2380 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 308. 576 U.S. 155 (2015). 
 309. See id. at 177 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting many “examples of 
speech regulated by government that inevitably involve content 
discrimination, but where a strong presumption against constitutionality has 
no place”). 
 310. See, e.g., Leading Cases, First Amendment—Freedom of 
Speech— Compelled Speech—National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. 
Becerra, 132 HARV. L. REV. 347, 351 (2018) [hereinafter Leading Cases] 
(“Taken as written, NIFLA represents a dramatic expansion of the scope of 
First Amendment protection for commercial speech that threatens the entire 
foundation of a broad range of consumer protections.”).  
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jurisprudence.311 It may also undermine the state’s ability to 
protect public health. 
In this Part, we reiterate that NIFLA itself does not require 
“public health originalism.” And even if a traditionalist 
perspective is to inform First Amendment analysis of compelled 
disclosures, history suggests that there is a long tradition of 
such practices on the state and federal levels. We then turn to 
the sites of conflict and doctrinal contestation that NIFLA left 
open. In so doing, we focus in particular on the understanding 
of “uncontroversial” in the wake of NIFLA. Given that the 
subject of that decision was abortion, there might be good reason 
to question its applicability to other topics.312 In fact, 
commentators have already suggested that NIFLA is best read 
as an abortion decision.313 Finally, taking the NIFLA majority 
at its word, it is quite possible—though entirely unsupported by 
the Court’s own analysis—that the majority does not, in fact, 
envision its approach as challenging the wide range of areas 
Justice Breyer’s dissent identifies.314 We therefore end by 
suggesting that if the majority really means what it said in 
NIFLA to assuage the dissent’s concerns, the decision by its own 
terms must be read narrowly. 
 
 311. See, e.g., Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech and the 
Content-Neutrality Trap, 127 YALE L.J.F. 150, 171 (2017) (“But emphasizing 
content neutrality does not resolve, and instead exacerbates, the theoretical 
and doctrinal uncertainties at the root of the professional speech issue.”). 
 312. See Leading Cases, supra note 310, at 355 (“If the Court did not intend 
NIFLA to signal the defeat of all commercial disclosure requirements, then 
the rationales underlying the decision seem intended to justify differential 
treatment of abortion opponents and reproductive rights supporters.”). See 
generally Caroline Mala Corbin, Abortion Distortions, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1175, 1210 (2014) (asserting that abortion exceptionalism leads courts to 
ignore “fundamental principles [in First Amendment jurisprudence] or distort 
them beyond recognition”). 
 313. See, e.g., Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 300, at 66 (“NIFLA v. 
Becerra is only secondarily about speech. Instead, we believe this case is 
primarily about the conservative Justices’ hostility to abortion rights.”). 
 314. See infra Part III.C. 
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A.  Originalism and Traditionalism in Public Health 
Regulation 
NIFLA does not require rigid originalism. None of what 
follows is to suggest that NIFLA is correctly decided. In fact, we 
have each previously argued that it is not.315 We merely contend 
here that NIFLA does not require lower courts to employ a novel 
originalist approach such as Judge Ikuta’s.316 Instead, NIFLA 
might require a form of traditionalism that can accept many (if 
not all) health and safety disclosures.317 
As discussed above, Justice Thomas’ analysis in NIFLA is 
better characterized as traditionalist, rather than originalist. 
Recall that he nodded to history only in response to Justice 
Breyer’s concern, in dissent, about the impact of the majority’s 
approach on health and safety laws. For the Court, Justice 
Thomas stated, “Contrary to the suggestion in the dissent, we 
do not question the legality of health and safety warnings long 
considered permissible, or purely factual and uncontroversial 
disclosures about commercial products.”318 Likewise, he 
acknowledged the longstanding torts of malpractice and 
informed consent.319 Nowhere did he state that only laws that 
existed at some specific prior time would be constitutional; nor 
even that only those laws that were long recognized were 
constitutional. Rather, Justice Thomas sought to reassure that 
despite the application of strict scrutiny in that case, health and 
safety laws that had long been considered permissible faced no 
 
 315. See Parmet, supra note 10, at 1490–91; Haupt, supra note 10, at 
197– 98. 
 316. See supra notes 163–166 and accompanying text (noting that Judge 
Ikuta’s opinion differs from the NIFLA majority opinion in its addition of the 
word “only”). 
 317. See supra Part II.C (arguing that there is a long history of health and 
safety warning laws). 
 318. Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 2361, 
2376 (2018). 
 319. See id. at 2373 (“Longstanding torts for professional malpractice, for 
example, ‘fall within the traditional purview of state regulation of professional 
conduct.’” (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963))). 
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jeopardy.320 Thus, history was used to save health and safety 
laws, not to limit them.  
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence likewise urged a historical 
perspective. He urged that the analysis should “begin by reading 
the First Amendment as ratified in 1791.”321 His admonition, 
however, remained at such a high level of abstraction that it 
failed to provide clear guidance to the lower courts on how to do 
so. But like the majority, Justice Kennedy did not demand 
“public health originalism” as deployed by Judge Ikuta. 
If Judge (now Justice) Kavanaugh’s approach in AMI is a 
guide for the future direction the Court might take if it decides 
to look to history to determine the constitutionality of compelled 
speech laws, the posture is decidedly traditionalist, rather than 
originalist.322 The difference between the AMI majority and 
Judge Kavanaugh’s concurrence, as Robert Post explains it, is 
the willingness “to name names”: whereas the court relies on the 
indirect reference of a “long history of country-of-origin” 
information, Judge Kavanaugh noted that the interest was to 
support American farmers and ranchers, but that the state had 
been reluctant to articulate this interest.323 Nonetheless, as we 
 
 320. See id. at 2376 (stating affirmatively that no existing health and 
safety laws hang in the balance of constitutionality).  
 321. Id. at 2379 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
It is forward thinking to begin by reading the First Amendment as 
ratified in 1791; to understand the history of authoritarian 
government as the Founders then knew it; to confirm that history 
since then shows how relentless authoritarian regimes are in their 
attempts to stifle free speech; and to carry those lessons onward as 
we seek to preserve and teach the necessity of freedom of speech for 
generations to come. 
 322. See Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. (AMI), 760 F.3d 18, 30 (D.C. 
Cir. 2014) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (addressing the constitutionality of 
compelled country-of-origin disclosures on meat products). 
 323. See Post, supra note 30, at 890 (quoting Judge Kavanaugh’s 
concurring opinion). 
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explained earlier, both the majority324 and Judge Kavanaugh325 
took a historical perspective that included consideration of the 
long history of country-of-origin information. With respect to 
public health disclosures, Judge Kavanaugh’s admonishment to 
explicitly name the state interest arguably will be easier to meet 
than articulating the state interest in AMI. What is more, in 
directly contrasting country-of-origin labels and disclosures “to 
ensure consumer health and safety,” Kavanaugh placed the 
latter on constitutionally firmer footing.326 
Typically, the state interest in public health warnings will 
be supported by health data indicating a scientific finding of 
some health danger. This finding will likely be more easily 
articulable the more fully the science has developed and the 
stronger the scientific consensus. Theoretically, the stance that 
courts take when reviewing the underlying data depends upon 
if the regulation falls within Zauderer, which permits rational 
basis review, or outside of that case, in which case strict scrutiny 
is applicable.327 In NIFLA, however, the Court appeared to test 
the strength of the support for the regulation prior to 
determining the standard of review that was applicable.328 In 
effect, a type of strict scrutiny was applied to determine if strict 
scrutiny applied.329 That move relied on the Court’s use of the 
“uncontroversial” prong of Zauderer, to which we now turn. 
 
 324. See AMI, 760 F.3d at 23–24 (majority opinion) (“[C]ountry-of-origin 
label mandates indeed have a ‘long history.’ Congress has been imposing 
similar mandates since 1890, giving such rules a run just short of 125 years.”). 
 325. See id. at 32 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“That historical pedigree is 
critical for First Amendment purposes and demonstrates that the 
Government’s interest here is substantial.”). 
 326. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 327. See supra notes 47–50 and accompanying text. 
 328. See Leading Cases, supra note 310, at 353 (“Instead of focusing on 
whether consumers’ informational interest justified lesser scrutiny of 
disclosure mandates, as the Court did in Zauderer, Justice Thomas focused on 
the harm of requiring anti-choice clinics to advertise ‘the very 
practice . . . [they] are devoted to opposing.’” (quoting NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 
2371)). 
 329. Judge Ikuta’s original panel decision in American Beverage I also 
utilized the uncontroversial language in Zauderer in such a way as to require 
a type of strict scrutiny to determine whether strict scrutiny was applicable. 
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B.  Zauderer After NIFLA 
NIFLA added new uncertainty to the meaning of Zauderer’s 
“uncontroversial” prong. What is controversial in NIFLA was 
not the existence of California’s legislation or the licensing of 
facilities, but rather the entire topic of abortion.330 What does it 
mean to interpret “uncontroversial” as required by Zauderer as 
encompassing the entire topic as in NIFLA? Take questions 
surrounding the safety of childhood vaccines as one example.331 
The science itself is uncontroversial, but the topic is nonetheless 
subject to widespread public controversy.332 The FDA operates 
within the scientific realm, but under the First Amendment’s 
reinterpretation in NIFLA, can labels that offer information to 
which many (or even just a few) laypeople disagree meet the test 
of being “uncontroversial”?333 Similarly, imagine the new 
COVID-19 vaccines. Can the FDA still require a warning label 
about their risks, or the fact that they were authorized without 
completing all of the regulatory steps that would ordinarily be 
required for full FDA approval? The debates about the 
coronavirus vaccines, and the warnings that it should contain 
 
See Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco (American Beverage 
I), 871 F.3d 884, 890–91 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 330. See Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 
2361, 2372 (2018) (describing abortion as “anything but an ‘uncontroversial’ 
topic” and concluding that “[a]ccordingly, Zauderer has no application here”). 
 331. See Bill Bero, The Great Vaccination Safety Debate—To Vaccinate 
Your Child or Not, FRANCISCAN HEALTH (Oct. 30, 2016), https://perma.cc
/L7DQ-PAVQ (discussing the current debate regarding whether vaccinations 
are safe for children). 
 332. See id. (asserting that the many health organizations including the 
“American Academy of Pediatrics, [t]he Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, [and] National Institutes of Health” say that vaccines are safe 
despite the ongoing debate). 
 333. This is a question distinct from the fact that there may be scientific 
disagreement which the law already addresses in various ways. See Claudia 
E. Haupt, Unprofessional Advice, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 671, 671 (2017) 
(“[P]rofessions are best conceptualized as knowledge communities whose main 
reason for existence is the generation and dissemination of knowledge. But 
knowledge communities are not monolithic; there is a range of knowledge that 
is acceptable as good professional advice. Advice falling within this range 
should receive robust First Amendment protections.”). 
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(given the lack of full approval) are likely to be intense.334 Would 
this mean that the FDA could not require that manufacturers 
provide any specific information about what is and is not known 
about new vaccines? Future judicial interpretations of 
“uncontroversial” in light of NIFLA could potentially allow the 
existence of such controversy to undermine the government’s 
efforts to ensure transparency. Indeed, warnings may be less 
legally viable precisely when they are needed most, for new 
products in which the risks are less well-known.  
The D.C. Circuit’s majority opinion and the Kavanaugh 
concurrence in AMI addressed the broader problem with the 
“uncontroversial” prong by taking a historical view.335 Would 
such a historical perspective inform the permissibility of vaccine 
labels or public health information regarding the benefits of 
vaccinating people during a pandemic? Posing this question 
illustrates the limits of the historical view. In other words, what 
is or is not a controversial issue cannot be resolved by looking 
(only) to historical practice. Indeed, such an approach might 
force a court to see controversies where none now exist, or to 
miss controversies that new scientific findings have now ignited. 
In the Ninth Circuit, the meaning of “uncontroversial” was 
tested in its decision in CTIA,336 after the Supreme Court 
remanded that case in light of NIFLA.337 Importantly, the Ninth 
Circuit’s second decision in CTIA (which reaffirmed its earlier 
holding) did not read NIFLA “as saying broadly that any purely 
factual statement that can be tied in some way to a controversial 
issue is, for that reason alone, controversial.”338 Rather, the 
Ninth Circuit interpreted the problem in NIFLA to be that 
“[w]hile factual, the compelled statement took sides in a heated 
 
 334. See Alec Tyson et al., U.S. Public Now Divided Over Whether to Get 
COVID-19 Vaccine, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 17, 2020), https://perma.cc/GE8L-
MCNB (announcing that the percentage of Americans who report that they 
would get the coronavirus vaccine has sharply declined since earlier this year 
due to concerns about the safety and effectiveness of the vaccine). 
 335. See supra notes 73–79 and accompanying text. 
 336. CTIA–The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 928 F.3d 832, 844 (9th 
Cir. 2019). 
 337. Id. at 836. 
 338. Id. at 845. 
 
PUBLIC HEALTH ORIGINALISM  297 
 
political controversy, forcing the clinic to convey a message 
fundamentally at odds with its mission.”339 This is why the 
compelled disclosure “was deemed controversial within the 
meaning of Zauderer and NIFLA.”340 We will return to the 
question whether this is the most plausible reading of NIFLA. 
However, applied to the disclosures at issue in CTIA, this 
understanding allowed the Ninth Circuit to determine that, 
despite disagreement about the dangers posed by 
radio-frequency radiation, the “required disclosure is 
uncontroversial within the meaning of NIFLA. It does not force 
cell phone retailers to take sides in a heated political 
controversy.”341 Moreover, the court quoted the “long considered 
permissible” part of NIFLA, noting that the disclosure at issue 
in CTIA was “a short-hand description of the warning the FCC 
already requires cell phone manufacturers to include in their 
user manuals.”342 The court did not, however, specify the length 
of time for which these warnings have been included, much less 
what “long considered permissible” means in this context.  
Contrasting our vaccine/FDA label scenario with the CTIA 
warnings illustrates the uncertainty NIFLA invites. In CTIA, 
the Ninth Circuit explained that “the compelled statement [in 
NIFLA] took sides in a heated political controversy.”343 If this is 
the correct understanding of “uncontroversial,” we may be faced 
with a continuum of controversies. We find it difficult to imagine 
a more politically divisive topic than abortion.344 Perhaps the 
 
 339. Id. 
 340. Id. 
 341. Id. at 848. 
 342. Id. 
 343. Id. at 845. 
 344. This is not to say that there is not significant agreement in the 
medical community about numerous facts relating to the safety of abortion. 
The fact that a topic is controversial does not mean that all facts related to it 
are uncertain. See June Med. Servs. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2133 (2020) 
(invalidating Louisiana’s law that required physicians who perform abortions 
to have admitting privileges at a nearby hospital, and holding it 
unconstitutional under Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt); Whole Woman’s 
Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2310 (2016) (holding that Texas law’s 
requirement that providers have admitting privileges at local hospital located 
no more than thirty miles from their abortion facility imposed undue burden 
on women’s right to seek previability abortions). But see Aziza Ahmed, Medical 
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emergent popular disagreement—contra the scientific 
consensus—surrounding vaccines is sufficiently controversial to 
place it in a similar category.345 But NIFLA itself provides no 
guidance on this point, nor does it help us to understand what 
other disputes are sufficiently controversial so that Zauderer’s 
rational basis review does not apply, even when the compelled 
speech is supported by scientific consensus.  
C.  Reconciling NIFLA and Public Health Regulation 
We end our exploration of NIFLA’s impact on public health 
regulation by taking the majority at its word. In response to 
Justice Breyer’s dissent, the majority asserted: “Contrary to the 
suggestion in the dissent, we do not question the legality of 
health and safety warnings long considered permissible, or 
purely factual and uncontroversial disclosures about 
commercial products.”346 If that were so, certainly the “public 
health originalism” approach must fail. But beyond that, lower 
courts would still lack necessary guidance helping to decide 
which types of public health and safety warnings may be 
compelled by the state. 
What would a First Amendment framework look like that 
did actually address the dissent’s concerns? In order to sketch 
the outlines of an answer, we must return to the underlying 
normative interests.347 A theoretically grounded defense of the 
NIFLA majority’s assertion would have required unpacking 
these interests. We argue here that NIFLA, if read narrowly, 
 
Evidence and Expertise in Abortion Jurisprudence, 41 AM. J.L. & MED. 85, 
86– 87 (2015) (arguing that courts have selectively relied on medical expertise 
in their abortion jurisprudence).   
 345. See Emmarie Huetteman et al., In Debate, Pence and Harris Offer 
Conflicting Views of Nation’s Reality, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Oct. 8, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/8Q73-U3FC (illustrating the topics that Mike Pence and 
Kamala Harris discussed in their vice-presidential debate including the 
administration of a COVID vaccination and abortion). 
 346. Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 2361, 
2376 (2018). 
 347. See generally Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. 
L. REV. 1277 (2014) (examining free speech theory in the context of compelled 
disclosures). 
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could largely be squared with the state’s interest in regulating 
public health and safety. However, a normative justification for 
the permissibility of health and safety warnings that rests solely 
on their historical pedigree seems difficult to conceive. Perhaps 
in light of democratic self-government concerns, what has long 
been deemed permissible cannot easily be undone. Indeed, this 
seems to be the normative thrust of AMI.348  
We only offer a first rough sketch of a normatively grounded 
analysis here.349 One plausible reading of NIFLA that would 
permit public health and safety warnings would place a clearer 
focus on listener autonomy interests.350 This suggests that the 
nods in NIFLA toward accepting malpractice liability and 
informed consent despite the restraints they impose on speech 
are thus best understood as acknowledging the value of 
expertise to patients.351 Of course, NIFLA itself failed to take 
such a perspective or to give weight to the interest of CPC 
“patients” in receiving factual information regarding the options 
available to them.352 With respect to the continued viability of 
Zauderer-type disclosures after NIFLA, then, the bulk of 
disclosures we discussed in Part III.D would survive only if we 
understand the NIFLA majority’s vague gesture at tort law and 
informed consent as affirming the value of expertise.353 As we 
noted, rather than limiting consumer choice, disclosures and 
warnings add to consumers’ available information regarding the 
 
 348. See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text. 
 349. For another recent effort, see Lim, supra note 8, at 192. 
 350. See Laurent Sacharoff, Listener Interests in Compelled Speech Cases, 
44 CAL. W. L. REV. 329, 378 (2008) (“Listener autonomy differs from speaker 
autonomy in that it refers to the autonomy to think and deliberate, to consider 
choices, and to evaluate information and ideas—rather than the autonomy to 
perform the act of speaking.”). 
 351. See Haupt, supra note 311, at 1271 (discussing how clients and 
patients benefit from professional expertise). 
 352. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2388 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Abortion is a 
controversial topic . . . but the availability of state resources is not a normative 
statement or a fact of debatable truth. The disclosure includes information 
about resources available . . . and it expresses no official preference for one 
choice over the other.”). 
 353. See supra notes 291–296 and accompanying text. 
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risks and benefits of a product (as affirmed by expertise) and 
thus enable informed consumer choice.354  
In the same vein, “uncontroversial” must be tied to 
expertise.355 This does not mean that only compelled disclosures 
tied to expertise are permissible, but health and safety warnings 
informed by and consistent with expertise provide the strongest 
basis for regulation.356 At the same time, it is important to 
acknowledge that the category of public health and safety 
regulations has traditionally been permissible.357 In our view, 
this suggests that while courts should ask if the type of 
regulation is a traditional one, they should assess the content 
based on the current state of scientific expertise.358 Indeed, the 
NIFLA majority’s own reference to the traditional regimes of 
malpractice and informed consent supports this reading.359 As a 
matter of tort law, the substantive content of both custom and 
information necessary for informed consent is not set at some 
point in the past but rather reflects current custom and 
information about risks.360 In effect, tradition has never 
 
 354. See supra notes 268–271 and accompanying text. 
 355. See Leading Cases, supra note 310, at 352 (“Many scholars . . . have 
seized on the word ‘uncontroversial,’ . . . arguing that it should refer to the 
possibility of disagreement over a compelled disclosure’s truth, and some 
supporting heightened judicial scrutiny of compelled factual disclosures when 
the context or relevance of the disclosure is controversial.”). 
 356. See Haupt supra note 311, at 1253 (“Knowledge communities have 
specialized expertise and are closest to those affected . . . . The professions as 
knowledge communities have a fundamental interest in not having the 
state . . . corrupt or distort what amounts to the state of the art in their 
respective fields.”). 
 357. See supra Part II.C.  
 358. Of course, expertise is dynamic rather than static in its development 
over time. For example, we do not suggest that medical expertise as it existed 
at some point in the past ought to determine the content of contemporary 
regulation. Rather, the type of regulation (i.e., police powers public health and 
safety regulation) is one that has historically existed without raising 
constitutional concerns. See supra Part II. 
 359. See supra notes 135–136 and accompanying text. 
 360. See Corbin, supra note 347, at 1288 (“Standard informed consent 
requirements are neutral as to what decision the patient makes. They are 
designed to ensure that patients understand the proposed procedure, its 
physical risks and benefits, and the risks and benefits of the alternatives.”). 
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demanded that speech regulations affirm messages that are 
outdated in terms of the science.361 
Thus, in the context of public health and safety disclosures, 
what constitutes a potential health risk ought to be decided 
based on expertise and the underlying scientific information 
that experts are interpreting, regardless of popular 
controversies surrounding the issue. Courts, accordingly, should 
uphold warnings that are consistent with expertise. In that 
regard, expertise is outside of the political process such that 
ordinary First Amendment doctrine—including in particular 
the requirement for content neutrality—does not apply.362 
Moreover, the argument that the disclosure requirement results 
from the state “taking sides” is an unhelpful way of addressing 
these types of disclosures.363 The CTIA decision on remand 
attempted to cabin the reach of “uncontroversial,” as a plausible 
reading of NIFLA would demand.364 At the same time, we do not 
think that this emphasis on the connection between history and 
expertise provides a sufficient normative explanation for the 
result in NIFLA where political divisiveness rather than expert 
knowledge seems to have driven the analysis. To be sure, as we 
have already noted, few issues are as divisive as abortion. And 
so the most plausible justification for NIFLA remains that it is 
primarily an abortion decision wrapped into a First Amendment 
claim. There may be some other topics, as we have discussed 
above, that are so controversial, and about which people hold 
such deeply held personal beliefs that perhaps the state should 
not be able to compel speech, even if it is supported by expertise. 
But we are fairly certain that whereas abortion is on the other 
 
 361. See id. at 1333 (“On the contrary, providing misinformation precludes 
true informed consent.”). 
 362. See Haupt, supra note 225, at 539–43 (describing the democratic 
dimension of professional advice). See generally ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, 
EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR 
THE MODERN STATE (2012) (developing a theory of First Amendment rights 
that seeks to explain both the need for the free formation of public opinion and 
the need for the distribution and creation of expertise). 
 363. See supra note 340 and accompanying text. 
 364. See supra notes 337–340 and accompanying text. 
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side of that boundary, the fact that sugary sodas cause cavities 
is not.365 
Ultimately, the normative inquiry demonstrates that 
NIFLA must be interpreted quite narrowly. The NIFLA 
majority starts its analysis from the premise that content-based 
restrictions on speech are presumptively unconstitutional.366 
But as Justice Breyer noted, the requirement of 
content-neutrality is particularly problematic with respect to 
health and safety warnings, because they must be content-based 
by design: they warn of a specific risk.367 The poison warning 
cannot say “Poison or not poison.” It also matters if the warning 
label is true or false. An aggressive form of content-neutrality, 
however, is not primarily the result of NIFLA but rather results 
from the doctrinal combination of Reed and Sorrell we discussed 
earlier.368 There are contexts in which content-neutrality is 
inapposite.369 In the area of health and safety disclosures, our 
laws have never demanded it and it ought to be rejected.370 
Prohibiting such warnings does not square with our 
constitutional tradition, nor does it permit self-governance, as it 
 
 365. See Anna Schaefer, What Does Soda Do to Your Teeth?, HEALTHLINE, 
https://perma.cc/7AU8-V2W2 (last updated Sept. 17, 2018) (summarizing 
scientific findings that soda causes tooth erosion and cavities). 
 366. See Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 
2361, 2371 (2018) (“As a general matter, such laws ‘are presumptively 
unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that they 
are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.’” (quoting Reed v. 
Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015))). 
 367. See id. at 2380 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Virtually every disclosure law 
could be considered ‘content based,’ for virtually every disclosure requires 
individuals ‘to speak a particular message.’” (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 
576 U.S. 155, 175–76 (2015))); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 589 
(2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Regulatory programs necessarily draw 
distinctions on the basis of content.”). 
 368. Cf. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 177 (2015) (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (providing “examples of speech regulated by government that 
inevitably involve content discrimination, but where a strong presumption 
against constitutionality has no place”).  
 369. See, e.g., Haupt, supra note 311, at 151 (suggesting that content 
neutrality should be rejected in the context of professional speech).  
 370. See Reed, 576 U.S. at 177 (Breyer, J., concurring) (providing the 
regulation of prescription drugs as an example of regulated speech that 
involves content discrimination but the presumption against constitutionality 
has no place (citing 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(4)(A))). 
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disables consumers from using the disclosure law to protect 
themselves. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s current First Amendment doctrine 
has set public health and safety regulation and commercial 
speech on a collision course. Most recently, the NIFLA decision 
has prompted grave concerns about the constitutionality of 
compelled disclosures. The Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision in 
American Beverage II—one of the earliest interpretations of 
NIFLA by a federal appellate court—vividly illustrates the 
consequences of the interpretive uncertainty created by the 
Court in the area of commercial speech more generally and 
compelled public health and safety warnings specifically. Judge 
Ikuta’s concurrence, advancing an analytical approach we call 
“public health originalism,” magnifies the risk, offering a 
profoundly misguided interpretation of NIFLA, that was made 
possible, in part, by the confusion created by NIFLA.  
As we have shown, public health originalism fails on its own 
terms. Since the Constitution’s founding, health and safety 
warnings have existed and have not been thought to clash with 
freedom of speech. Nor should they be so viewed today. NIFLA 
does not require public health originalism. Nevertheless, if as 
the NIFLA majority insists, and as we have shown, the decision 
does not call into question wide swaths of public health and 
safety regulation, it must be read quite narrowly. If it is not, the 
doctrinal and normative ailments that are afflicting First 
Amendment jurisprudence will begin to afflict our health. 
 
